McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court determined that Kansas' Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) served a vital penological purpose and determined that allowing minimal incentives to take part in the SATP does not equal compelled self-incrimination as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
[1] No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
”To qualify as incriminating there must be a “real danger” of prosecution, and not merely a “remote and speculative possibilit[y].” [6] Respondent Lile felt that his Fifth Amendment rights were being infringed upon.
[1] He declined to fill out the “Admission of Responsibility” form and felt the penalties incurred for nonparticipation in the program was sufficient evidence of unconstitutional compulsion.
[1] The two main reasons the program does not offer immunity for admission of any criminally deemed activity are because the, “potential for additional punishment reinforces the gravity of the participants’ offenses and thereby aids in their rehabilitation”, and the, “State confirms its valid interest in deterrence by keeping open the option to prosecute a particularly dangerous sex offender”.
[1] The decision was handed down by Justice Kennedy and, “concluded that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment”.
Lastly, the consequences presented must not cause compulsion and, “must, ‘not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’”.
[3] Another contributing factor for why the consequences for Lile not participating in the SATP were not found as compulsory were because the prison sentence was not extended in any way and credit for good behavior or his chances or parole were not affected.
[1] Justice Stevens’ dissent found that the combined effect of the consequences presented to Lile were, “in fact severe, but even if that were not so, the plurality’s policy judgment does not justify the evisceration of a constitutional right”.
[6] Stevens concluded that, “[n]o matter what the goal, inmates should not be compelled to forfeit the privilege against self-incrimination simply because the ends are legitimate or because they have been convicted of sex offenses".