McNamara–Taylor mission
The self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức at a busy Saigon intersection was a public relations disaster for the Diệm regime, and as protests continued, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces loyal to his brother Ngô Đình Nhu, raided pagodas across the country on August 21, killing hundreds and causing extensive damage under the declaration of martial law.
US President John F. Kennedy gave the following instructions to McNamara regarding the purpose of the mission: I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong.
The events in South Vietnam since May have now raised serious questions both about the present prospects for success against the Viet Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort unless there can be important political improvement in the country.
McNamara was to "speak some home truths" and emphasize that the administration was not "open to oriental divisive tactics" and that the advancement of the military campaign was the sole objective.
[1] Kennedy instructed Lodge to "clear the air" by convincing Diệm to make the "dramatic, symbolic move" of removing Nhu and refocusing the nation on the war effort.
Arthur Schlesinger and Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, contended that Kennedy sent McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam to convince them of the negative effect on the counterinsurgency that the protracted Buddhist crisis was having, and of the need to apply sanctions to the Diệm regime to bring about change.
Diệm feared that Minh had become too popular after his success in the Battle for Saigon against the criminal Bình Xuyên and his campaigns to quell the private armies of the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài religious sects in the 1950s and had removed him from commanding troops.
[2]: 371 The differing views of the members of the U.S. mission about the progress of the war against the Viet Cong, and how it was affected by the Buddhist crisis were immediately manifested in the first session that McNamara and Taylor held in Saigon with embassy officials on September 25.
In Saigon, during the last few days of the trip, he was given extensive briefings by the civilian side of the mission and, since he stayed at Lodge's residence, McNamara had ample opportunity for discussions with the Ambassador.
Following a briefing from senior army officers which glossed over the capture of two towns in An Xuyên Province by the communists, Taylor and McNamara asked a major stationed at Cần Thơ to assess the situation.
"[2]: 374 By the end of the trip, Bundy conceded that the evidence was eye opening, commenting that "I was left, as I think McNamara was, with a lasting skepticism of the ability of any man, however honest, to interpret accurately what was going on.
McNamara emphasized the difficulties being caused by anti-Buddhist repressions were creating for Kennedy's support of South Vietnam due to the arousal of negative public opinion against Diệm.
[2]: 372 He removed a newspaper clipping from his pocket in which she was quoted as calling some US officers as "acting like little soldiers of fortune" which she claimed had caused the Americans to pursue a "confused policy".
He asserted that Madame Nhu's membership in the National Assembly as a citizen of a "free country" allowed her to express her sentiments, alleging that "one cannot deny a lady the right to defend herself when she has been unjustly attacked.
After talking to scores of officers, Vietnamese and American, I am convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the end of 1964.
Conditions are needed for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to an effective campaign directed at the objective, vital to both of us, of defeating the Viet Cong and of restoring peace to your community.
[1]The mission took a diversion into investigating a possible coup by ARVN officers when General Dương Văn Minh expressed an interest in meeting McNamara and Taylor, either alone or together.
After an extensive series of discretionary arrangements were made, Taylor joined Minh in a game of doubles on the tennis court of the Saigon Officers Club.
[2]: 373 On September 30, Taylor and McNamara's last day in Vietnam, together with Lodge, the trio met with South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ.
[2]: 373–4 According to the Pentagon Papers "these views, from the man most often mentioned in U.S. circles as an alternative to Diệm, coming at the end of the visit as they did, must have had an important influence on McNamara's conclusions."
[1] During the briefings that Lodge made to McNamara and Taylor, the ambassador repeated his previously expressed doubts about the potential effectiveness of aid suspension as a lever against Diệm.
Both opinions were regarded as important because McNamara and Taylor had been specifically charged by Kennedy with examining ways to make American aid better facilitate US foreign policy goals objectives.
On the other hand, it warned that the serious political tensions in Saigon due to the Buddhist crisis and the increasing unpopularity of Diệm and Nhu as a result of their anti-Buddhist activities could stoke the dissent of some ARVN officers and erode what they believed was favourable military progress.
[2]: 375 The report concluded that the ARVN must focus on "clear and hold operations" rather than broad sweeps and that an improvement in Vietnamese performance would permit "the bulk of US personnel" to withdraw by the end of 1965.
[1] The report was regarded as a compromise between General Taylor and Harkins' optimistic view of the military, McNamara's increasing conviction of the gravity of the political crisis and its potential to derail the anti-communist war effort.
The recommendations for aid suspensions and the announcement of US troop withdrawals were designed as measures that would foster doubt within the Diệm regime about American intentions and incentives for policy changes.
The press release reiterated America's commitment to the struggle against the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, stated the progress of the war, announced the troop withdrawal, and dissociated the Kennedy administration from Diệm's anti-Buddhist activities.
[1]The recommendations on negotiations are concerned with what U.S. is after, i.e., GVN action to increase effectiveness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to eliminate strains on U.S. Government and public confidence.
Lodge was specifically told to seek improvements in the ARVN military effort, domestic reforms by Diệm that would restore public belief in the South Vietnamese administration and its image.
The tack of applying positive pressures against an ally to obtain compliance with American policies was taken optimistically given that it was to be led by an ambassador who was "uniquely equipped by background and temperament to make it succeed".
