'[8] For İçduygu and Aksel, the ongoing membership negotiations between Turkey and the European Union demonstrate the strategic use of migration diplomacy as a bargaining tool.
For Adamson and Tsourapas, coercive migration diplomacy relies on states' adoption of a unilateral approach to interstate bargaining, namely a zero-sum perspective of relative gain, where only one side is expected to benefit.
[1] Greenhill has written on the conditions under which the intentional creation, manipulation, and exploitation of real or threatened mass population movements may constitute an element of coercion in international relations.
[11] The emphasis on coercive behaviour does not encapsulate the full range of state practices: in the case of Niger, the government 'benefits from a degree of international legitimacy and support' and is particularly aid dependent.
'[2] Cooperative migration diplomacy is predicated upon interstate bargaining explicitly aiming for mutually beneficial arrangements in the absence of aggression.