Track II diplomacy

[3] The efforts of these conflict resolution professionals, generally operating through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities, arose from the realization by diplomats and others that formal official government-to-government interactions were not necessarily the most effective methods for securing international cooperation or resolving differences.

The problem most political liberals fail to recognize is that reasonable and altruistic interaction with foreign countries cannot be an alternative to traditional track one diplomacy, with its official posturing and its underlying threat of the use of force.

The second process involves working to shift public opinion: "Here the task is a psychological one which consists of reducing the sense of victim hood of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the adversary.

The book was finally published in 1987 and states that The official government apparatus for analyzing international security issues and designing foreign policy has to equip itself to support and benefit from track two diplomacy.

[10]At a special briefing for representatives of non-governmental organizations, the U.S. Department of State's Deputy Director for Political Affairs in the Office of Iraq presented a plea for help from NGOs (Paul Sutphin, 2004).

Acting under Secretary Colin Powell's initiative and authority, the State Department's Iraqi analysts explained their frustrations in conducting dialogue, developing grassroots relationships, and rebuilding infrastructure.

[12] One of the successful track two dialogue processes can be the Oslo Accords of 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which achieved some remarkable breakthroughs in the Israeli–Palestinian relationship.

From 2003 to 2007 it partnered with Camp Tawonga to bring hundreds of adults and youth from 50 different towns in Palestine and Israel to successfully live and communicate together at the Palestinian-Jewish Family Peacemakers Camp—Oseh Shalom – Sanea al-Salam.