[4] In February 1969, the Guinean government moved against the armed forces after alleging that a plot centred in Labé, the centre of the Fula (French: Peul; Fula: Fulɓe) homeland was planning to assassinate then-president Ahmed Sékou Touré and seize power, or, failing that, force the secession of Middle Guinea.

Increasing mistrust of the regular armed forces after the Labé plot led to the militia assuming greater importance.

These committees were encouraged by party officials to report dishonest practices such as theft and embezzlement of funds which might 'endanger the achievements of the revolution.'

Following government praise for these units' efforts, the militia's role expanded, especially as black-market activity and smuggling grew worse.

Touré had heralded this policy in 1967 when he wrote: 'thanks to their special political, physical, and social training, the people's militia will become the indisputable mainspring of our security system, of which the conventional armed forces constitute [but] a fundamental section.

Soldiers of all ranks had to find ways to supplement their rations and were often reduced to working either on state farms or in small agricultural projects.

'[15] Source: Mamadou Kaly Bah, Regard Rétrospectif sur l'Armée Guinéenne, 1 November 1993 On 3 April 1984, following Touré's death, Lansana Conté, assistant chief of staff of the army, led a coup d'état which toppled the interim head of state.

A military junta, the CMRN, was installed, which started to feud within itself, and quickly, as had occurred under the Touré regime, the paramount national security concern became the preservation of the president's power.

[17] Regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000–2001 attacks along the southern border by rebels acting as proxies for Liberia's Charles Taylor had important effects on the security forces.

[18] The Conté government was deeply involved in the First Liberian Civil War as it supported ULIMO, the major grouping opposing Taylor in Liberia.

Yet on the other side of the border the Guinean government also contributed troops to the ill-fated ECOWAS peacekeeping force ECOMOG in Liberia.

More serious was a 1996 attempted coup that originated as a military mutiny caused by the armed forces' poor living conditions.

As of early 2010, AI said that at least two senior military officers named by the United Nations as potentially having individual criminal responsibility for events constituting crimes against humanity, remain in positions of influence in the Guinean Presidential Cabinet, despite the formation of a new transitional government.

The International Crisis Group said in September 2010 that from 2001 to 2009 the size of the armed forces has risen dramatically from 10,000 in 2001 to a reported 45,000 in 2010 (though the latter figure needs to be treated with great caution.

Erratic mass promotions have resulted in an inverted structure, with more officers than regular soldiers, undermining professionalism and straining the defence budget.

'[24] After achieving independence from France in 1958, the Force Aerienne de Guinea was formed with Soviet assistance in the delivery of 10 MiG-17F fighters and two MiG-15UTI trainers.

Other eastern bloc deliveries included three Aero L-29 jet trainers, six Yak-11s and Romania contributed licensed built IAR-316 Alouette III and two IAR-330L Puma transport helicopters.