Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War

Prior to Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India had no plans for large scale military action in East Pakistan.

[4] The Indian Army kept parity with Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan since 1965, and in 1971 one armoured brigade and one infantry division was deployed in West Bengal.

The main reason Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali and Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan had opposed military action against Bengali civilians was the fear of an Indian attack,[7] which the Pakistan army was woefully unprepared to meet in March 1971.

The 14th infantry division with its brigades posted at Comilla (53rd), Dhaka (57th), Rangpur (23rd) and Jessore (107th) was the only Pakistani unit in East Pakistan prior to March 1971.

Indian planners assumed that Pakistani army would try to defend the whole of the province to prevent Mukti Bahini from establishing the government inside Bangladesh.

3 divisions were to secure the area between Ashuganj and Chandpur, then if possible approach Dhaka by crossing the Meghna using helicopters or ferry – whichever was available.

The IV corps (8th, 57th and 23rd mountain divisions) would be responsible for the South Eastern Sector, while a rear HQ looked after Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland and the Chinese border.

During May – November, while Mukti Bahini engaged Pakistani forces, Eastern Command, having never contemplated or anticipated large scale military action against East Pakistan[24] began building up logistical infrastructure while army support services (Engineer, Ordnance and Medical) began to build up capacity to sustain a 4 week long campaign.

Osmani (Commander in Chief Bangladesh Forces) had differences of opinion with the Indian leadership regarding the role of the Mukti Bahini in the conflict.

By mid June Pakistan army had occupied all the towns and fortified 90[38] of the 370 BoPs (half of the BoPs were destroyed by Indian shellfire by July 1971 to facilitate Mukti Bahini infiltration)[39] and deployed in all the sensitive towns, while the other Para military units were deployed around the country to maintain internal security.

[54] The gist of the DMO Plan, presented to Eastern Command in August 1971, was: North – Western Sector:[55] The XXXIII corps (OC Lt. Gen. Thapan) would launch the 20th division attack along the Hili – Ghoraghat –Gaibandha axis to cut the area in two.

Singh all held the opinion that with the fall of Khulna and Chittagong, the primary seaports, Pakistani forces isolated inside the Dhaka bowl would capitulate.

Bakir (COS Eastern Command), Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Enam reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage, logistical difficulties, and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan.

Once the fortress defence was chosen, General Niazi and his staff designated the following cities as fortresses: Jessore, Jhenida, Bogra, Rangpur, Comilla and Bhairab Bazar (these were located on communication hubs), Jamalpur and Mymensingh (defending the northern perimeter of the Dhaka bowl), and Sylhet and Chittagong (independent defence areas).

Pabna, Bera, Chandpur, Daudkandi and Faridpur was to be turned into fortresses, while Kamarkhali, Goalanda, Nagarbari and Narshindi were to be strong points.

Pakistani planners assumed, based on intelligence estimates, that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions and an armoured brigade, along with the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan in winter.

Pakistani planners were undecide on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogra or on the Hili – Chilimari axis from southwest to northeast to cut the area in two.

Tajammul Hossain Malik) would defend the area between Hili (a strongpoint) and Naogaon then fall back to Bogra (fortress) and hold out.

Nayeem) would look after the area between Rajshahi and Naogaon, and if need would fall back to the Outer Dhaka defence line and defend from Pabna and Bera, both proposed fortresses.

Pakistani planners assumed three likely axis of advance from the Indian army:[75][76] In September, an ad hoc brigade, the 314th,[77] (CO Col. Fazle Hamid, one Mujahib battalion, and 5 companies each from EPCAF and Razakars) was created to defend the city of Khulna.

The brigades also had the option to fall back across the Madhumati river, which formed part of the Dhaka outer defense line, and defend the area between Faridpur, Kamarkhali and Goalanda.

[79] They deemed this area was impassable because of the hilly terrain on the Indian side and the Modhupur Jungle and the Brahmaputra river to the north of Dhaka.

M. Saadullah) was responsible for covering the border between Kamalganj and Kasba, just north of Comilla, and would block the expected main enemy axis of advance, with strong points at Akhaura and Brahmanbaria.

Saadullah anticipated a 3 pronged assault on his area around Akhaura and planned to ultimately fall back to Bhairab, which was the nearest fortress and part of the Dhaka outer defence line.

It was to concentrate near Comilla in the event of an Indian advance, then fall back to Daudkandi and Chhandpur, which were part of the Dhaka outer defence line and designated "Fortresses".

GHQ Rawalpindi approved in October 1971 and also gave permission to conduct offensive operations against English Bazar or Balurghat in West Bengal and sending SSG commandos to destroy the Farrakka barrage[91] In November Gen. Niazi split the 14th division, keeping the 202nd, 27th and the 313rd brigades under it.

After fighting at the border the force was to redeploy around the Mainamati fortress and then fall back to defend Daudkandi, which was on the Dhaka Outer defence line.

The Indian Army HQ plan of August was modified by Eastern Command during October – November and operational instructions were given to various formations.

The final plan did not target Dhaka as the main objective,[92] and a contingency scheme to quickly withdraw at least 2 divisions and redeploy against possible Chinese moves was also incorporated.

The plan was: The main responsibility of the IV core along with Mukti Bahini sector no 2 and 3 were to secure the area between Ashuganj and Chandpur, contain Comilla and then if possible approach Dhaka by crossing the Meghna using helicopters or river ferries – whichever was available.