Mind uploading

[5] According to supporters, many of the tools and ideas needed to achieve mind uploading already exist or are under active development; however, they will admit that others are, as yet, very speculative, but say they are still in the realm of engineering possibility.

Alternatively, the simulated mind could reside in a computer inside—or either connected to or remotely controlled by—a (not necessarily humanoid) robot, biological, or cybernetic body.

Whole-brain emulation is discussed by some futurists as a "logical endpoint"[6] of the topical computational neuroscience and neuroinformatics fields, both about brain simulation for medical research purposes.

[9] Neuroscientists have stated that important functions performed by the mind, such as learning, memory, and consciousness, are due to purely physical and electrochemical processes in the brain and are governed by applicable laws.

It depends, we believe, only on mathematics and logic and on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemistry, and biology; it does not arise from some magical or otherworldly quality.

[13] Many theorists have presented models of the brain and have established a range of estimates of the amount of computing power needed for partial and complete simulations.

[17] While some researchers believe editing human brains to be physically possible in theory, for example by performing neurosurgery with nanobots, it would require particularly advanced technology.

A set of approaches known as loosely coupled off-loading (LCOL) may be used in the attempt to characterize and copy the mental contents of a brain.

Advocates of mind uploading point to Moore's law to support the notion that the necessary computing power is expected to become available within a few decades.

However, the actual computational requirements for running an uploaded human mind are very difficult to quantify, potentially rendering such an argument specious.

For whole brain simulation, this network map should show the connectivity of the whole nervous system, including the spinal cord, sensory receptors, and muscle cells.

The uploaded mind may then perceive a memory loss of the events and mental processes immediately before the time of brain scanning.

may preclude an accurate prediction of the volume of binary data required to faithfully represent a functioning human mind.

If it is possible to replicate neuron function from its visible structure alone, then the resolution afforded by a scanning electron microscope would suffice for such a technique.

However, as the physiological genesis of 'mind' is not currently known, this method may not be able to access all of the necessary biochemical information to recreate a human brain with sufficient fidelity.

Today, fMRI is often combined with MEG for creating functional maps of human cortex during more complex cognitive tasks, as the methods complement each other.

In this case, data specifying the information state of the neural network could be captured and copied as a "computer file" from the brain and re-implemented into a different physical form.

[44] A considerable portion of transhumanists and singularitarians place great hope in the belief that they may become immortal, by creating one or many non-biological functional copies of their brains, thereby leaving their "biological shell".

For example, Buddhist transhumanist James Hughes has pointed out that this consideration only goes so far: if one believes the self is an illusion, worries about survival are not reasons to avoid uploading,[47] and Keith Wiley has presented an argument wherein all resulting minds of an uploading procedure are granted equal primacy in their claim to the original identity, such that survival of the self is determined retroactively from a strictly subjective position.

In light of uncertainty about whether mind uploads are conscious, Sandberg proposes a cautious approach:[58] Principle of assuming the most (PAM): Assume that any emulated system could have the same mental properties as the original system and treat it correspondingly.The process of developing emulation technology raises ethical issues related to animal welfare and artificial consciousness.

[58] Bancroft argues for the plausibility of consciousness in brain simulations on the basis of the "fading qualia" thought experiment of David Chalmers.

Their emergence and existence may lead to increased risk of war, including inequality, power struggles, strong loyalty and willingness to die among emulations, and new forms of racism, xenophobia, and religious prejudice.

Operation of the brain depends on the dynamics of electrical and biochemical signal exchange between neurons; therefore, capturing them in a single "frozen" state may prove insufficient.

Therefore, while not rejecting the idea in principle, Miller believes that the complexity of the "absolute" duplication of an individual mind is insurmountable for the nearest hundreds of years.

The neuroscience and computer-hardware technologies that may make brain emulation possible are widely desired for other reasons, and logically their development will continue into the future.

[72] Emulations might be easier to control than de novo AI because: As counterpoint to these considerations, Bostrom notes some downsides: Because of the postulated difficulties that a whole brain emulation-generated superintelligence would pose for the control problem, computer scientist Stuart J. Russell in his book Human Compatible rejects creating one, simply calling it "so obviously a bad idea".

[75] Ray Kurzweil, director of engineering at Google, has long predicted that people will be able to "upload" their entire brains to computers and become "digitally immortal" by 2045.

[citation needed] In 1993, Joe Strout created a small web site called the Mind Uploading Home Page, and began advocating the idea in cryonics circles and elsewhere on the net.

Episode four, titled "How to Teleport", mentions that mind uploading via techniques such as quantum entanglement and whole brain emulation using an advanced MRI machine may enable people to be transported vast distances at near light-speed.

Richard Doyle's Wetwares: Experiments in PostVital Living deals extensively with uploading from the perspective of distributed embodiment, arguing for example that humans are currently part of the "artificial life phenotype".