Ministry of Interior and Defence
[2] Recognising the urgent need for a credible defence force amid the ongoing Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation and the British military draw-down East of Suez, Goh acted swiftly in making strategic decisions.
[4] In November 1965, the first group of advisors from the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) arrived discreetly in Singapore, codenamed as "Mexicans" to avoid offending the local and regional Malay-Muslim population.
[2][7] This partnership led to the formulation of a confidential defence plan in 1966, which involved modelling the SAF after the Israeli army's military doctrine, weapons platforms and universal conscription system, with the exception of national service for women.
[2][7] Over a ten-year period, the plan intended to expand the army to twelve battalions by mobilising Singapore's male population.
Under the leadership of Brigadier-General Kirpa Ram Vij, the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) was established in February 1966 to build the requisite military infrastructure.
[8] In an unorthodox move, Goh selected Jesuit priest Father Terence J. Sheridan to draft the SAF code of conduct in 1967, aiming to instil strong moral values within the armed forces.
The bill would enforce the registration of all 18-year-old male Singapore citizens and permanent residents for part-time national service spanning 12 years.
[5] During the second reading of the bill on 13 March 1967, the Minister for Interior and Defence Goh Keng Swee justified its necessity on the grounds of national security and nation-building.
He argued that without a robust defence force, Singapore would be rendered subservient to whoever could provide it protection, jeopardising its sovereignty and causing instability in the region.
[5] On the other hand, a well-defended Singapore could contribute substantially towards future defence arrangements and act as a stabilising force in Southeast Asia.
[5] Post independence, Singapore suffered security constraints due to its small geographical size, lack of strategic depth, and limited military capabilities.
[11] To compensate for these deficiencies, it focused on: While the "poisonous shrimp" strategy served Singapore well in its infancy, its main flaw was in being inherently defeatist.
The doctrine implicitly acknowledged that Singapore might ultimately be overrun, aiming only to ensure that the aggressor suffered severe losses in the process.
After the division of the MID in 1970, the SAF's significant growth and enhanced capabilities began to contradict the premises of the "poisonous shrimp" doctrine.
[11] In May 1969, following the loss of United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in the 1969 Malaysian general election, Malaysia experienced an episode of violent Chinese-Malay clashes in Kuala Lumpur known as the 13 May Incident.
[3][13] Amid rising Malay nationalism in Malaysia, Singapore took the initiative to enhance its armoured warfare capacity by procuring 72 AMX-13 light tanks from Israel in January 1968.
[14] In a political act to assert its military prowess, Singapore made the calculated move of showcasing a mobile column of AMX-13 and V200 armoured vehicles during its National Day Parade on 9 August 1969, during which the Malaysian Prime Minister and other foreign delegates were in attendance.
[4] Under the purview of the MID, the Internal Security Department (ISD) and its employment of anti-subversion laws were effective in curtailing the operations of pro-communist and communalist elements.
[18] Although the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) remained active in staging bombings and arson attacks from 1970 to 1971, these were deemed as largely inconsequential to the government.
Singapore's historical trauma from the Japanese occupation and its terse relations with neighbouring countries reinforced the necessity of strengthening its external defence.
[18] The division of the MID into MINDEF and MHA enabled more focused control over the internal and external spheres of Singapore's security.
