Missile defense

In this context, the term "theater" means the entire localized region for military operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers; defense range of these systems is usually on this order.

Advantages: Disadvantages: Given the immense variety by which a defense system can operate (targeting nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical, and theater missiles), there are some unarguably effective exoatmospheric (outside the Earth's atmosphere) countermeasures an attacking party can use to deter or completely defend against certain types of defense systems, ranges of ACBM's, and intercept locations.

These decoys are usually small, lightweight dud rockets that take advantage of the interceptor sensors tracking and fool it by making many different targets available in an instant.

Because objects of differing weights follow the same trajectory when in space, decoys released during the midcourse phase can prevent interceptor missiles from accurately identifying the warhead.

This creates a similar situation as the result of the replica decoy, increasing the chance that the real warhead passes through the system and strikes the target.

This system of "anti-simulation" allows the attacking warhead to, in some cases, take advantage of the "bulk-filtering" of certain missile defense systems, in which objects with characteristics of the warhead poorly matching those expected by the defense are either not observed because of sensor filters, or observed very briefly and immediately rejected without the need for a detailed examination.

[2] This is perhaps the most extreme approach to countering missile defense systems that are designed to destroy ICBMs and other forms of nuclear weaponry.

There is currently no proposed countermeasure to this type of attack except through diplomacy and the effective banning of biological weaponry and chemical agents within war.

The command center allows for human management in accordance to the incorporated sensory information- BMDS status, system coverage, and ballistic missile attacks.

The interface system helps build an image of the battle scenario or situation which enables the user to select the optimal firing solutions.

Since then, many elements have been added to update the C2BMC, which act to provide further sensory information and allow for enhanced communications between combatant commanders.

[15][16] The function of ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) systems is to provide combatants the ability to seek and destroy intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles en route to the US homeland.

The MIDS LVT terminals are installed on most bombers, aircraft, UAVs, and tankers, allowing for the incorporation of most air defense systems.

[20][21] IBCS engagement stations will integrate raw data from multiple sensors and process it into a single air picture, and choose elect different weapons and launcher locations depending on the detected threat instead of being limited to particular unit capabilities.

[16] In 2021, F-35 sensor data were linked via airborne gateway to ground-based IBCS, to conduct a simulated Army fires exercise, for future Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

[25] As a result of these estimations, McNamara opposed implementation of Nike-X due to the high costs associated with construction and perceived poor cost-effectiveness of the system, and instead expressed support for pursuing arms limitations agreements with the Soviets.

[11] In 1964 the Soviets publicly unveiled their newest interceptor missile named the "Galosh" which was nuclear armed and was meant for high altitude, long range interception.

[29] There were known flaws with the design such as an inability to defend against MIRV and decoy style weapons.The reason for this was because the detonation of a nuclear interceptor missile like the "Galosh" creates a cloud of plasma that temporarily impairs radar readings around the area of the explosion limiting these kinds of systems to a one-shot capacity.

[11] Finally, the missiles that could be held on each base was limited by the ABM treaty to only 100 launchers maximum, meaning that in a massive attack they would be depleted quickly.

Originally, the agreement made by the Nixon administration and the Soviet Union stated that both of the two nations were each allowed to have two ABM defensive systems present in their own countries.

However, a few years later in 1974 both sides reworked the treaty to include only one ABM defensive system present around an ICBM launch area or the nation's capital city.

This program faced controversy over the feasibility of the projects it pursued, as well as the substantial amount of funding and time required for the research to develop the requisite technology.

During the Clinton administration, the initial goal the United States had interest in, was to negotiate with the former Soviet Union, which is now Russia, and hopefully agree to a revision to the treaty signed a few decades prior.

Nira Schwartz's and Theodore Postol's criticisms about the technical feasibility of these sensors have led to a continuing investigation of research misconduct and fraud at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[40][41] The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee which acts as the tasking authority for the theater missile defense program.

The NRC Ad hoc Working Group on TMD is the steering body for NATO-Russia cooperation on theater missile defense.

In September 2018, a consortium of 23 NATO nations met to collaborate on the Nimble Titan 18 integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) campaign of experimentation.

As of early 2010, the Alliance has an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 3,000 kilometers).

During the 2008 Bucharest summit, the alliance discussed the technical details as well as the political and military implications of the proposed elements of the US missile defense system in Europe.

[47] According to BioPrepWatch, NATO has signed a 136 million euro contract with ThalesRaytheonSystems to upgrade its current theater missile defense program.

The Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile
Trajectory phases
127th Command and Control Squadron – Distributed Common Ground System
Seal of the United States Strategic Command
USCG Command Control and Communications
Missile Defense Agency logo
As part of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, all radars for detecting missiles were placed on the edges of the territory and faced outward.
An artist's concept of a Space Laser Satellite Defense System as a part of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Various ICBMs used by varying countries.
A NORAD Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) station in western Greenland is visible in the distance beyond the snow-drifted equipment pallets in the foreground of this photograph. The DEW Line was designed to track inbound ballistic missiles.
HMS Diamond firing an Aster missile for the first time in 2012.