Accordingly, as by 1 April 1904, he had nominated no Afghan official to meet Major Roos-Keppel, who had now been waiting for two whole months with all necessary transport in readiness, he was informed that owing to the lateness of the season the matter would have to be deferred till the following autumn.

A third and smaller party of khasadars, mostly Morcha Khel Baezai, though ostensibly acting against the Sarhang's orders, crossed the river on rafts and made a sudden and unexpected attack on the village, opening fire at close range.

The Amir emphatically declined to call the Sarhang to account, and even forwarded and endorsed a decidedly impertinent letter from Muhammad Husain Khan laying claim to Smatzai as Afghan territory.

The first serious violation of British territory took place on 21 March 1906, when a gang consisting mainly of Afghan Mohmands, assisted by outlaws from Hazarnao in Ningrahar, raided the village of Jogini, near Michni.

On the advance of this force into Bazar in February, several fanatical mullas attempted to raise help for the Zakka Khel, and signs of unrest were apparent among most of the tribes living north of the Kabul river, more especially amongst the Mohmands, the majority of whom were already in a state of discontent through the construction of the Shilman railway.

By 17 April the gathering had assumed such large proportions that a reinforcement of one squadron cavalry, 2 guns, and 550 infantry was sent out to Lieutenant-Colonel Fane, and General Sir James Willcocks himself left Peshawar to arrange the disposal of the force.

There was great delay in starting, however, and it was not till 10-40 a.m. that the advance guard left Peshawar; consequently the troops had to carry out the long march of 18 miles (29 kilometres) to Shabkadar under a burning sun, and suffered considerably.

General Willcocks advised them to attend the jirga, and inform the Hazrat Sahib that no invasion of Mohmand territory was at present contemplated, but that any attack on a British post would meet with immediate reprisals.

The following morning signs of great activity amongst the enemy were apparent, and bodies of men, varying from 30 to 60 in number, were visible making sangars on the line of foothills, guarding the entrances to the Gandao and Pandiali valleys.

As further inaction in face of such a fanatical gathering would have in all probability led to very serious trouble along the entire frontier—reports of unrest in Bajaur and attempts to raise rebellion in Upper Swat had already come to hand—General Willcocks decided to forestall any move by the Hazrat Sahib and attack the enemy in position on the following day.

Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent in the Khaibar, wired on 1 May that the enemy had crossed the border in considerable numbers, and that the Sufi Sahib's emissaries were attempting to bring about a general rising among the Loargai Shinwaris and in Tirah.

From this point up to within one mile of Dand but little difficulty was experienced with the transport; here, however, the track falls sharply into the bed of the Gandao stream and much time was spent before a sufficiently graded descent could be made over the slippery rock.

The column accordingly moved into the bed of the Bohai Dag, while a double company was sent to gain possession of a long spur, which runs in a north-westerly direction between the villages of Gudai Tangi and Ahad Kor, and the seizure of which would protect the left flank.

Here the column watered from a large tank known as Ata Jor, which is about 1.5 miles east of Khan Beg Kor on the left bank of a nala joi nin g the Bohai Dag from the foot of the Khapak Pass.

As soon as the rear-guard reached the junction of the Khapak and Bohai Dag nalas, the enemy began to follow up the retirement with gradually increasing numbers and boldness; and as casualties commenced to occur a double company 57th Rifles was placed in ambush, a short distance to the west of Ato Khel.

Rain began to fall heavily and as it had now become very cold Major Climo again signalled down, this time requesting that a relief party might be sent with blankets, waterproof sheets, and filled water bottles for those remaining on the hill, and also blanket-stretchers to take down the deadband wounded, who occupied nearly all the available space in the piquet.

Both columns left camp at 8:30 a.m., the first, under General Barrett in person, dealing with the village of Sro and the western hamlets of Gumbatai; and the second, under Colonel Phillips, 28th Punjabis, with Khajak Shah, Khwaja Kuhai, and Chingai.

To this end the Officer Commanding 54th Sikhs was ordered to advance with his battalion along the high ground on the right flank of General Barrett's column, until he reached a position overlooking the pass, and covering the approach thereto from the northwest.

[3] All the country within reach of Nahakki had now suffered severely, and Sir Janies Willcocks decided to send out a column to punish the Khwaizai still further, and, if possible, destroy the Koda Khel villages at the head of the Bohai Dag at the same time.

Shortly after passing Halimzai limits the 2nd Brigade was fired on from both sides of the valley, and it quickly became evident that the enemy, who held a position extending for about 2 miles from the half ruined village of Sur Dag on the right, along the steep ridge north of the road to the high range above Mazrina, would have to be dislodged before any further advance could be made.

As it was advisable first to clear Zanawar China and the spurs above it the 28th Punjabis were sent to storm these heights, supported by two guns of the 28th Mountain Battery and the half battalion of the 34th Pioneers, the latter being ordered to move straight on the village and destroy its defences.

The cavalry were ordered to move to Khan Beg Kor, covering the front and right flank of the infantry; the Seaforth Highlanders, 54th Sikhs and 23rd Mountain Battery were directed to march straight to the Ata Jor tank, which had been selected as the camping ground for the night, and the remaining troops were told to follow as soon as the destruction of the various toners and villages had been completed.

On arrival at the tank detachments from each corps were left to dig the entrenchments, whilst the remainder advanced to Khan Beg Kor, and attacked the ridge behind the village, which had been reported to be strongly held by the enemy.

The 54th Sikhs, who formed the advance-guard, piquetted the spurs of the range south-east and south of the village, while the Seaforth Highlanders and a double company 55th Rifles occupied a steep ridge to the north; the cavalry meanwhile operated in the main valley in the direction of Koda Khel, thereby guarding the left flank and real of the brigade.

It was now beginning to get dusk and every available man not in the firing line was utilized in preparing the perimeters of the two villages, while orders were despatched to the 63rd Sikhs and 57th Kifles to withdraw on camp, their retirement being assisted by parts of the 22nd Punjabis and 59th Rifles respectively, while the guns, though much hampered by a blinding duststorm which made laying very difficult, rendered good support.

Darkness was now coming on, and as all the transport was in and the perimeters in a more or less forward condition the troops were withdrawn as quickly as circumstances permitted, and disposed in the two villages for the night, the enemy keeping up a hot but not very effective fire while the finishing touches were being put to the defences.

Next morning a column composed of 0.5 squadron cavalry, 2 guns, 4 company Sappers and Miners, 22nd Punjabis and 59th Scinde Rifles was despatched at 5 a.m. under Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler with orders to burn the village of Bagh—the summer residence of the Gud Mulla.

The Pipal Nala down which the force now commenced to advance is dominated on the right bank by the high Sarlara range, which runs roughly from west to east, parallel to the stream, and throws out a spur to the north-east.

Soon after the advance commenced information was gained by a cavalry reconnaissance that this spur was singared[check spelling] and held by the enemy in considerable numbers, their position extending right across the Pipal Valley immediately above its junction with the Ambahar, with their right and centre guarded by a network of nalas very similar to that in front of Yakh Dand.

When the 57th Rifles and 22nd Punjabis reached the slopes overlooking Kargha they opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who were then in full flight, and the cavalry with the baggage column were ordered to push on down the nala and endeavour to get into the fugitives.