Kadivar started his career as a teacher teaching fiqh and Islamic philosophy at Qom Seminary for fourteen years.

In 2007 political pressures forced Kadivar to leave his teaching appointment for a position at the Research Center of the Iranian Institute of Philosophy.

As punishment for his criticism, Kadivar was sentenced to eighteen months in prison after being convicted by the Special Clerical Court in 1999, on charges of having spread false information about Iran's "sacred system of the Islamic Republic" and of helping enemies of the Islamic revolution,[11] or as another observer put it, "for commenting on the contradiction between the revolution's aims to serve the people and the subsequent concentration of power in the hands of clerics.

[6] According to Kadivar, "Velayat e Motlaghe ye Faghih" reflects a spectrum of authoritative options for Islamic society.

"Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" in Religious Matters (Shari'at) along with the Monarchic Mandate of Muslim Potentates in Secular Matters (Saltanat E Mashrou'eh) Advocates: Mohammad Bagher Majlesi, Mirza ye Ghomi, Seyed e Kashfi, Sheikh Fadlullah Nouri, Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi.

"General Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsults" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye 'Ummeh) Advocates: Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (Sahib Javahir) Ayatollahs Borujerdi, Golpayegani, Khomeini (before the revolution) 3.

"Constitutional State" (with the permission and supervision of Jurisprudents) (Dowlat e Mashrouteh) Advocates: Ayatollahs: Sheikh Esma'il Mahallati, Mohammad Hosein Na'ini 6.

"Popular Stewardship along with Clerical Oversight" (Khelafat e Mardom ba Nezarat e Marjaiat) Advocate: Ayatollah Mohammad Bagher Sadr (secondary opinion) 7.

"Collective Government by Proxy" (Vekalat e Malekan e Shakhsi ye Mosha)" Advocate: Ayatollah Mehdi Ha'eri Yazdi Having laid out a spectrum of authoritative options for Islamic society, in his second volume, Government by Mandate (Hokumat e Vela'i), Kadivar criticises Ayatollah Khomeini's theology, the most absolutist thesis among the varieties of "Velayat e Motlaghe ye Faghih" and the one enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The work unfolds in two phases: the first, lays bare the presuppositions of the concept of Velayat, which concerns the meaning of the term, its interpretation in mysticism (Irfan), philosophy (Kalam), jurisprudence (Fight'h), The Qur'an, and Tradition (Sonnat).

He traces the first indication of the thesis to the writings of eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists namely, Mohaghegh e Karaki, Shahid Thani, and Ahmad Naraghi.

Kadivar, thus determines the age of the concept as less than two centuries, a mere blinking of an eye compared to the history of Shiite jurisprudence.

[6] But he reserves his most devastating attacks for the second part of the book that is devoted to the critical analysis of the proofs and confirmations of the principle of government by divine mandate.

[6] Kadivar's theory of foundational reform in shari'a could be abstract in this way: The three preconditions of being rational, just, and better than the solutions offered by other religions, did not only pertain in the age of revelation.

The philosophy behind the presence of these precepts in unchanging Scripture and Tradition was the need to solve the problems of the age of revelation and similar situations.

Despite his perfections, the Prophet would have been unable—without the direct assistance of God—to solve the countless problems related to organizing religion and running society.

Hence, there was no alternative but to formulate—alongside the unchanging and permanent Shari’a precepts—temporary precepts that were contingent on the continuation of the underlying best interests, and to include them in Scripture and Tradition.

Ayatollah Khomeini's Perspective of Governmental or Expedient Fiqh, which is the official policy of Islamic Republic of Iran, aside from its flexibility, encounters four problems.

The second type considers that women, because of their lesser capacities, are entitled to fewer rights than men in managing the home and in society.

At the same time, reason and Shariʿa required that women be treated with justice and according to what is commonly accepted as good, as right (maʿrūf).

According to egalitarian justice and fundamental equality, although women differ from men physically and psychologically, they are entitled to equal rights because they are human, and it is humanity – not gender, colour, race, class, religion, or political ideology – that carries rights, duties, dignity, and trust and divine vice-regency.

Traditional jurists, by employing ijtihad, have arrived at this judgment and have claimed consensus by relying on solitary (akhbar wahid) or dependable (muwatthaqah) hadiths.

(b) The necessity of suspending or stopping the implementation of punishment for hudud that would lead to the killing of a person during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam.

(c) Since the judgment on killing is based on solitary reports (al-akhbar al-ahad), it is mandatory to exercise caution by negation the rule of shedding someone's blood.