[1] William Bundy would later note that this group was "'the most comprehensive' Vietnam policy review 'of any in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
'"[2] Nikita Khrushchev had just been overthrown on October 15, 1964, and American foreign policy experts did not know what to expect from Russia as Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin took over the Soviet world.
[3] Brian VanDeMark captures the mood: This fear [of communism], however exaggerated, reflected deeply rooted perceptions.
[8] The representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Lloyd Mustin, was much more certain America could and should win a battle in North Vietnam.
[9] The two men's differing points of view were synthesized by John McNaughton, a personal representative of Robert McNamara in the working group, who called from "translating the facets of a problem [namely the Vietnam War] into statistical probabilities in order to facilitate precise, objective decisions.