[1][2] The Fukushima nuclear accident "cannot be regarded as a natural disaster," the NAIIC panel's chairman, Tokyo University professor emeritus Kiyoshi Kurokawa, wrote in the inquiry report.
"[3] "Governments, regulatory authorities and Tokyo Electric Power [TEPCO] lacked a sense of responsibility to protect people's lives and society," the Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission said.
[4] In addition, the Commission recognized that the affected residents are still struggling and facing grave concerns, including the "health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment".
The nuclear incident "cannot be regarded as a natural disaster," the NAIIC panel's chairman, Tokyo University professor emeritus Kiyoshi Kurokawa, wrote in the inquiry report.
"[3] "Governments, regulatory authorities and Tokyo Electric Power [TEPCO] lacked a sense of responsibility to protect people's lives and society," the Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission said.
According to the report the lack of training and knowledge of the TEPCO workers at the facility reduced the effectiveness of the response to the situation at a critical time following the quake and tsunami.
As the crisis escalated, TEPCO, the regulators, government agencies and the prime minister's office were ineffective in "preventing or limiting the consequential damage" at Fukushima Daiichi.
[6] "According to this commission's study, on March 11, it is believed that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was in a vulnerable condition with no guarantee it could withstand earthquakes and tsunamis," the report said.
[4] According to the New York Times the report criticized Tepco as being too quick to dismiss earthquake damage as a cause of the fuel meltdowns at three of the plant's six reactors, which overheated when the site lost power.
Tepco has contended that the plant withstood the earthquake that rocked eastern Japan, instead placing blame for the disaster on what some experts have called a “once in a millennium” tsunami that followed.
“Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.”[10] Chain of command were disrupted amid the crisis which created confusion, while communication failures about critical decisions undermined trust between the different parties.
"[11] Then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan traveled to the plant mid-meltdown and “diverted the attention and time of the on-site operational staff and confused the line of command,” the report said.
[10] The commission recommended that the Diet establish a permanent, parliamentary oversight panel to deal with nuclear power and supervise regulators and to ensure that the government and utilities carry out the necessary measures to prevent any recurrence of the Fukushima disaster.