[7] Pro-administration War Democrats in states like Ohio sought to cooperate with Republicans through the formation of Union parties in opposition to the anti-administration Peace faction.
[9] Besides allowing voters of diverse pre-war partisan allegiances to unite under a common banner, the Union label served a valuable propaganda purpose by implying the coalition's opponents were dis-unionists.
The party's 1864 platform called for the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment, a "liberal and just" immigration policy, completion of the transcontinental railroad, and condemned the French intervention in Mexico as dangerous to republicanism.
During the presidency of Millard Fillmore, Daniel Webster and others envisioned the Union Party as a vehicle for political moderates to support the Compromise of 1850 against attacks from abolitionists and secessionist Fire-Eaters.
[12] However, a significant number of ex-Whigs, including various opponents of the Democrats in the slave states, remained aloof from the new Republican organization, in part because of the party's reputation for abolitionism.
Observers frequently attributed rising sectionalism and radicalization to the work of unscrupulous party agitators whose reckless pursuit of power had brought the nation to the brink of destruction.
Simultaneously, the belief that the success of one's party was in the best interest of the survival of the nation naturally lent itself to the conclusion that partisan rivals were a threat to Union and republicanism.
[19] In the months between Lincoln's election and inauguration, conservatives implored the incoming administration to break with the Republican Party in order to facilitate an alliance with southern moderates that could restore the Union and avert a civil war.
Substantial opinion maintained that a majority of white Southerners still opposed secession, but that suspicion of abolitionism prevented them from working in concert with the Republican Party.
[20] Lincoln, however, was unwilling for the Republican Party to follow the fate of the Whigs and alienate its base of support in the free states in pursuit of an alliance with southern conservatives.
[21] During the winter of 1860–61, he intervened decisively to defeat the Crittenden Compromise, a set of proposed constitutional amendments that would have guaranteed the existence of slavery in perpetuity south of the 36°30′ line.
In short order, the Confederate bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion, the secession of the four Upper South states, and military mobilization in both the Union and the Confederacy remade the political landscape in both sections.
This was achieved in Maryland and Kentucky by the creation of Union parties that won congressional elections in the summer of 1861; in Missouri and western Virginia[a], unionists organized special conventions that constituted the loyal governing authority in those areas.
[26] They were not affiliated with a national party organization in 1861 and walked a careful line by providing critical support to Lincoln's wartime administration while opposing the Republican position on slavery.
[27] In the free states, the attack on the flag inspired a spirit of unity that overwhelmed factional feeling and made appeals to traditional partisanship briefly untenable.
The appearance of unanimity in the face of secession masked real divisions over whether and how to carry out the war effort which deepened following the disastrous defeat of the Union forces at the First Battle of Bull Run.
Against the backdrop of a surging peace movement, vulnerable Republicans in the Lower North joined pro-administration War Democrats in Union parties that contested the 1861 and 1862 United States elections.
Such a party would provide the basis for national reconstruction following the end of the war, which Lincoln foresaw as "preeminently a political process" that would be guided by loyal residents of the seceded states.
They and many moderates believed the Republican Party had triumphed in 1860 by ruthlessly castigating the Slave Power and national Democrats and saw no reason to change strategies now that Southerners had taken up arms against the government.
[31] A similar situation existed in Indiana, where the state Democratic organization was divided between partisans of Senator Jesse D. Bright and former Governor Joseph A. Wright.
[32] In New York, where Lincoln narrowly defeated a fusion ticket composed of Democrats and Constitutional Unionists in 1860, the birth of the Union Party was marked by confusion.
After rejecting a Republican proposal for a nonpartisan unity ticket, the New York Democratic Party met in convention and adopted a platform condemning the wartime policies of the Lincoln administration.
[38] Circumstances in Kansas produced an unusual alliance of Democrats and Radical Republicans, who formed the Union Party in 1862 to oppose the controversial leadership of Jim Lane.
The 1862–63 United States House of Representatives elections saw opposition Democrats make significant gains in the Lower North, aided by anti-abolitionist backlash to the Emancipation Proclamation.
I have not permitted myself, gentlemen, to conclude that I am the best man in the country; but I am reminded, in this connection, of a story of an old Dutch farmer, who remarked to a companion once that 'it was not best to swap horses when crossing streams.'
In August 1864, Lincoln wrote and signed a pledge that should he lose the election, he would nonetheless defeat the Confederacy by an all-out military effort before turning over the White House:[42] This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected.
Frémont, aware that his candidacy could result in victory for the Democrats, made a deal to drop out of the presidential race in exchange for Blair's removal from office.
The convention sought to bring together moderate and conservative Republicans and defecting Democrats and forge an unbeatable coalition behind President Johnson and his Reconstruction policy.