Faced with a clearly superior French fleet in the summer of 1690 during the War of the Grand Alliance, Torrington proposed avoiding battle, except under very favourable conditions, until the arrival of reinforcements.
However, Torrington was forced to fight at the Battle of Beachy Head (June 1690), a French victory which gave Paris control of the English Channel for only a few weeks.
The threat forced the English government to divert warships to the defence of trade, as convoy escorts and cruisers to hunt down the privateers.
The disadvantage of the guerre de course when pursued as a battlefleet strategy, rather than just by smaller vessels, is that it leaves a country's own trade defenceless.
It was not until the middle of the 18th century that the continuous blockade first carried out by Sir Edward Hawke in 1758–59, and then brought to perfection by Earl St Vincent and other British admirals between 1793 and 1815, became possible.
Building the Panama Canal was designed not just to open Pacific trade to East Coast cities, but also to enable the new Navy to move back and forth across the globe.
[1][2] In Britain, Captain John H. Colomb (1838–1909) in a series of articles and lectures argued that the navy was the most important component of imperial defence; his brother, Admiral Phillip Colomb (1831–1899), sought to establish from history general rules applicable to modern naval warfare in his Naval Warfare (1891).
Corbett emphasized the interdependence of naval and land warfare and tended to concentrate on the importance of sea communications rather than battle.
Corbett defined the two fundamental methods of obtaining control of the lines of communication as the actual physical destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and or a naval blockade.
[4] With this race introducing many innovations to navies across Europe, in 1906 the British unveiled a revolutionary new warship called HMS Dreadnought powered by steam turbine.
The Germans' fleet at the time was, in some people's opinion, the most advanced, and was constructed by Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz.
[7] While this caused Germany to reduce such operations for a time, the strategy was ultimately resumed in an attempt to impede food and munitions supplies to Britain.
[7] The resumption of this strategy led many countries to try to ban the subsequent use of unrestricted submarine warfare, though this met with failure by the outbreak of WWII.
[8] Improved radio technology greatly advanced naval intelligence and coordination by increasing communication speed, efficiency, and range.
[7] This was especially notable in the Battle of the Atlantic, as Axis powers sought to restrict British and French contact with their colonial possessions and limit their involvement in the Pacific theater.
After American entry in 1941, US forces targeted Axis commercial and military fleets across the Atlantic basin and in the Pacific War.
Radio continued to play a vital role in naval communication during the Second World War as it did in the First,[8] the major difference being its widespread adoption by all combatants.
The strategy was presented by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Coast Guard at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, R.I.[9] The strategy recognized the economic links of the global system and how any disruption due to regional crises – man-made or natural – can adversely impact the U.S. economy and quality of life.