Neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development
[11] Pascual-Leone proposed that the increase of the number of mental units that one can represent simultaneously makes the persons able to handle more complex concepts.
Falling short or exceeding the mental power that is typical of a given age, results in slower or faster rates of development, respectively.
Robbie Case rejected the idea that changes in processing capacity can be described as a progression along Pascual-Leone's single line of development.
[13] Instead, he maintained that processing capacity development recycles over a succession of four main stages and that each of them is characterized by a different kind of mental structures.
That is, the command of the operations that define each kind of executive control structures improves, thereby freeing space for the representation of goals and objectives.
Each of these structures is supposed to involve a set of core processes and principles which serve to organize a broad array of situations; for example, the concept of more and less for quantities, adjacency and inclusion relationships for space, and actions and intentions for social behavior.
[15] Graeme S. Halford raised a number of objections regarding Case's definition of working memory capacity and its role in cognitive growth.
Structured interaction (scaffolding) and internalization are the processes that gradually allow potential (for understanding and problem solving) to become actual (concepts and skills).
[22] Michael Commons simplified and enhanced Piaget's developmental theory and offers a standard method of examining the universal pattern of development, named the model of hierarchical complexity (MHC).
According to these theories, progression to higher stages or levels of cognitive development is caused by increases in processing efficiency and working memory capacity.
In any case, these are all ways in which these theories argue for and present converging evidence that some adults are using forms of reasoning that are more complex than formal with which Piaget's model ended.
These differences make it difficult to equate the concepts and operations across the various systems in the mental load they impose on representational capacity, as the models above assume.
The input to this level is information arising from the functioning of processing potentials and the environment-oriented systems, for example, sensations, feelings, and conceptions caused by mental activity.
[citation needed] Working hypercognition is a strong directive-executive function that is responsible for setting and pursuing mental and behavioral goals until they are attained.
The functional shift models explains how new units are created leading to stage change in the fashion described by Case[13] and Halford.
[citation needed] In the hypercognitive system, self-awareness and self-regulation, that is, the ability to regulate one's own cognitive activity, develop systematically with age.
Practically this implies that our information processing capabilities come under increasing a priori control of our long-term hypercognitive maps and our self-definitions.
Metarepresentation is the primary top-down mechanism of cognitive change which looks for, codifies, and typifies similarities between mental experiences (past or present) to enhance understanding and problem-solving efficiency.
For example, if ... then sentences are heard over many occasions in everyday language: if you are a good child then I will give you a toy; if it rains and you stay out then you become wet; if the glass falls on the floor then it breaks in pieces; etc.
[citation needed] Moreover, there are brain regions, located mainly in the frontal and parietal cortex that subserve functions that are central to all cognitive processing, such as executive control, and working memory.
[38] Electroencephalographic coherency patterns throughout childhood and adolescence develop in growth spurts that are nearly identical to the time frame of the developmental cycles described above.
[39] In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in theories and methods that show promise for capturing and modeling the regularities underlying multiple interacting and changing processes.
Commons offered a description of the successive levels of cognitive development while allowing for the explicit reference to the particularities of concepts and operations specific to each of the domains.
It is suggested that fluid intelligence, that is the general mechanisms underlying learning, problem solving, and the handling of novelty, depends on these developmental processes.
An overarching definition of intelligence can be as follows: The more mentally efficient (that is, the faster and the more focused one works towards a goal), capable (that is, the more information one can hold in mind at a given moment), foresighted (that is, the more clearly one can specify one's goals and plan how to achieve them), and flexible (that is, the more one can introduce variations in the concepts and mental operations one already possesses) a person is, the more intelligent we call that person (both in comparison to other individuals and in regard to a general developmental hierarchy).
Education aims to help students acquire knowledge and develop skills which are compatible with their understanding and problem-solving capabilities at different ages.
In science teaching, early primary education should familiarize the children with properties of the natural world, late primary education should lead the children to practice exploration and master basic concepts such as space, area, time, weight, volume, etc., and, in adolescence, hypothesis testing, controlled experimentation, and abstract concepts, such as energy, inertia, etc., can be taught.
[45] The neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development suggest that in addition to the concerns above, sequencing of concepts and skills in teaching must take account of the processing and working memory capacities that characterize successive age levels.
In other words, the overall structure of the curriculum across time, in any field, must reflect the developmental processing and representational possibilities of the students as specified by all of the theories summarized above.
[13] For example, to support metarepresentation and facilitate the emergence of general reasoning patterns from domain specific processing, teaching must continually raise awareness in students of what may be abstracted from any particular domain-specific learning.
