New York Agreement

Penders, "None" of the other reasons, including to develop the island,[4] "advanced by the Netherlands for the continuation of their rule of West New Guinea" rationally served the Dutch national interest enough to hold a territory that would lead it to lose so much business and international goodwill.

[3] Beginning in the 1920s, large numbers of unemployed Indo people in Java persuaded the Dutch government to set up colonies in northern West New Guinea, which eventually failed to give the colonists the prosperity they expected.

[3] From 1951, the Indonesian government interpreted the results of the Round Table Conference as giving it sovereignty over all of the former Dutch East Indies, including New Guinea.

[3] When the Indonesian government withdrew from the Netherlands-Indonesia Union due to frustration at the slow pace of talks over New Guinea, the Netherlands felt relieved from any obligation to continue negotiations on the issue.

[5] In early 1959, a counsellor wrote a memo on behalf of the US Ambassador suggesting a plan for "special United Nations trusteeship over the territory for a limited number of years, at the end of which time sovereignty would be turned over to Indonesia".

[2] The Government's Bureau of European Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed the plan, both because of hostility towards the Indonesian President Sukarno, who had collaborated with the Japanese,[3] and support for the Netherlands, a NATO ally.

[8] President Kennedy later met with both the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and Sukarno, with both agreeing to a United Nations Trusteeship but disagreeing on the details.

In December, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy decisively advised Kennedy towards a more pro-Indonesian position, lest the "Soviet bloc... draw Indonesia even closer to it".

[2] Foreign Minister Subandrio, who regarded UN supervision and organization of the referendum as a "humiliation for Indonesia", only agreed to a set of pared-down guidelines for the plebiscite[4] when the United States threatened to "switch sides and support the Dutch".

A small minority of Council members, including Nicolaas Jouwe, refused to support the agreement and went into exile in the Netherlands,[6] he only returned to Indonesia in 2009.

[11] Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, the United Nations Secretary-General's representative in New Guinea, observed and approved the process of musyawarah during March and April 1969 for the final Act of Free Choice, although recommending that the councils be enlarged to better comply with the adult eligibility provision of the New York Agreement.

In October 1969 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution 84 to 0 with 30 abstentions[6] that noted "with appreciation the fulfilment... [of] the 1962 Agreement" and thanked Indonesia for "its efforts to promote the economic and social development of West Irian".

[12] In 2002, a nationalist assembly of Papuans led by independence activist Theys Eluay[13] declared the New York Agreement "unlawful and morally unacceptable, because Representatives from [West New Guinea] were not involved in it".

[12] However Indonesia negotiation teams led by Soebandrio in New York included Papuan representatives such as: Marthen Indey, Johannes Abraham Dimara, Albert Karubuy, Silas Papare, Frits Kirihio, and Efraim Somisu.

Regional map with West New Guinea highlighted. To the west, the Moluccas in Indonesia; to the east, the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea ); to the south, mainland Australia.
Joseph Luns was Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1971 under seven consecutive cabinets.
The New York Agreement fulfilled the dream of a "Republic of Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke ". [ 6 ] Indonesian flags mark those settlements within the regions of Aceh (left) and West New Guinea, both highlighted.