Both torts have been present from the time of Henry III, being affected by a variety of philosophical shifts through the years which saw them become first looser and then far more stringent and less protecting of an individual's rights.

Its chapter lies neglected in the standard works, little changed over the years, its modest message overwhelmed by the excitements to be found elsewhere in tort.

[6] The tort was in line with the economic status quo of the time, protecting claimants against their neighbours' rights to develop land, and thus has been described as "rural, agricultural, and conservative".

[13] In St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping,[14] for example, several judges "were explicit in suggesting that they were affected by the adverse effect of a more draconian view on the economic welfare of the country's industrial cities".

While A. V. Dicey maintained that the prevalent philosophy was one of laissez faire thanks to the influence of philosophers and economists such as Adam Smith, Michael W. Flinn asserted that: Another common error... has been the assumption that the classical economists were the only effective influence on social and economic policy in the early and mid-nineteenth century.

This is a curiously perverse view, since it ignores powerful voices like those of Bentham, Chadwick, the social novelists, many by no means inarticulate members of the medical profession, the humanitarians, the Christian Socialists and most sections of the many working class movements.

There was in short, nothing approaching a consensus of opinion concerning laissez-faire and state intervention, even in the very narrow social sector represented by governments, Parliament, and the press.

In practice the ears of ministers were assaulted by a confused babble of voices rather than bewitched by the soft whisper of a single plea for inaction.

In 1864 William Johnstone, a "wholesale pork pie manufacturer and sausage roll maker", was fined £15 (2023: £1,900), under the 1863 Act, for having on his premises a large quantity of meat unsound, unwholesome and unfit for food.

[25] There is a general rule that a landlord who leases a property is not liable for nuisances created after the occupier takes control of the land.

The latter was discussed in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd,[23] where the claimants argued that the blocking of their television signal by the construction of the skyscraper at One Canada Square was a nuisance.

This principle was extended in Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council,[41] where the Court of Appeal said that if a landowner knows or ought to know that their property may cease to support another's, they are required to take reasonable precautions or they will be liable.

[42] While there is no set definition of what is or is not unreasonable, factors that are taken into account include any "abnormal sensitivity" of the claimant, the nature of the locality where the nuisance took place, the time and duration of the interference and the conduct of the defendant.

[50] The granting of planning permission does not constitute immunity from a claim in nuisance, however; in Wheeler v Saunders Ltd.[37] the Court of Appeal said that it would be "a misuse of language to describe what has happened in the present case as a change in the character of the neighbourhood.

[51] Another exception was found in British Celanese v AH Hunt Ltd,[54] where an electronics company stored foil strips on their property which blew onto adjoining land, causing the power supply to a nearby yarn manufacturers to be cut off.

In Christie v Davey,[36] the defendant was deliberately creating a noise to frustrate the claimants; based on this, it was held that their actions were malicious, unreasonable, and amounted to a nuisance.

Some judicial rationes decidendi, such as that of Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan,[24] seem to indicate that private nuisance is only valid in situations where there are two occupiers of land.

Its chapter lies neglected in the standard works, little changed over the years, its modest message overwhelmed by the excitements to be found elsewhere in tort.

In Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd,[59] it was defined by Romer LJ as any act or omission "which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects".

Another difference is that public nuisance is primarily a crime; it only becomes a tort if the claimant can prove that they suffered "special damage" over and above the effects on the other affected people in the "class".

The test for the required size of a "class" was also discussed in the Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd, with the court concluding that the test was whether the nuisance was "so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large".

Abatement is a remedy that allows the claimant to directly end the nuisance, such as trimming back a protruding hedge.