[28] At the end of June 1899, Sultan Nur leaves the tariqa at Kob Fardod and arrives in his country Odweina in an effort to collect arms and men from the western section of the Habr Yunis clan.

Sultan Nur, failing to convince the western Habr Yunis, left eastward to Burao joining the eastern section of the clan who declared allegiance to the new dervish cause.

[31] In September 1899, after assembling at Burao the Dervish and their clan allies attacked the western Habr Yunis at Odweina under the insistence of Sultan Nur to punish the clansmen who opposed his call to join the rebellion.

[35] In October 1900, a combined various Isaq tribes (Samatar/Ahmed Abdalla, Habr Yunis and Aidagalla) attack the dervish and the Ogaden in retaliations crossing the border into Ethiopia.

[36] In March 1901, the dervish reentered Somaliland protectorate after being pushed out by the Abyssinian forces and their Somali tribal allies (Mohamed Zubeir Ogaden) [37] from the Ethiopian border.

The news of the incident that sparked the Dervish rebellion and to the almost twenty one years insurrection according to the consul-general James Hayes Sadler was either spread or as he alleged was concocted by Sultan Nur.

[40] Reginald Wingate and Rudolf Carl von Slatin were tasked in 1909 to ascertain the Somali nomad's attitude to both the administration and the dervish and to advise the British colonial office as to how to improve the situation in the protectorate.

In March 1899, one Duwaleh Hirsi, a former member of the Somali Aden police, then Mr Percy Cox's (former counsel-resident of Zeila and Berbera, 1893–1895) expedition guide in Somaliland allegedly stole a rifle and sold it to the tariqa at Kob Fardod.

[44]What is particularly revealing about Ahmed Adan's interview is the confusion that was caused by another letter carried by a Somali one Salan supposedly a message also from the British administration at the coast.

[48]It is unknown when exactly the tribal followers of the Kob Fardod tariqa and their leaders adopted the term "dervish", but the general time was at the end of April 1899.

At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards, leaving the line of division as reported in my previous dispatch"[51]Having failed to win over the western section of his tribe for the rebellion and the tribal assembly planned for July 22 having been aborted by Mullah Haji Musa of Hahia (head Mullah of the Ahmediyya tariqa at Hahi), Sultan Nur for the last time left to the east and to Burao and joined the eastern section of the rebellious tribe in his eastern headquarters.

[52] The assembled dervish and their clan allies sent the following stern letter to Captain Cordeaux and James Hayes Sadler: This is to inform you that you have done whatever you have desired, and oppressed our well-known religion without any cause.

Now choose for yourself; if you want war we accept it, if you want peace pay the fine.After assembling at Burao the Dervish and their clan allies, the Adan Madoba, Rer Yusuf, Ali Gheri, Jama Siad and the Musa Ismail what the Sadler calls forces from the Dhulbahnate in his correspondence[54] attacked the western Habr Yunis at Odweina in September 1899 under the insistence of Sultan Nur to punish the clansmen who opposed his call to join the rebellion and instead heeded the rival tribal mullah Haji Musa.

Before dispatching forces to face the Dervish at Samala Consul-General Hayes Salder made the following instructions to the overall commander of the forces Eric John Eagles Swayne: In the unlikely event of the: Mullah offering to surrender, in his case and that of the Following: Ahmed Warsama (known as Haji Sudi), Deria Arale, Deria Gure Only an unconditional surrender should be accepted no guarantee of any kind to future treatment been given.

The Camel Corps and Mounted Infantry at once moved out, and had proceeded some three miles, when scouts reported that the whole plain beyond the hill was simply swarming with men, both horse and foot, and that an attack' by the Mullah himself, with a large body of cavalry, on the rear of the column, was imminent.

Captain Mereweather, with a portion of the Mounted Infantry, was sent back to cover this movement of a large body of the ~ enemy's cavalry began to enter the' valley by an opening in the hills in the rear of our force.

The Mounted and Camel Corps at once started off at a hard galloping pursuit, and' after exciting long chase of about six miles caught up the enemy at the entrance to a "deep gorge in the hills".

His brother-in-law, Gaibdeed, was killed, as well as two sons-in-law, Haji Sudi's brother and nephews, &c. Sultan Nur's camels and the Mullah's cattle were captured.

The fleeing dervish fared no better after five days in the waterless Haud many died and Haji Sudi, the Mullah and his eldest son only survived by water from the stomach of slaughtered camels.

The British led forces were compelled to advance slowly, immediately the Dervish attacked from all directions causing the British led forces front line to fall back in a disarray, but the rear companies stood firm holding their position, the 2nd King African Rifles and 6th King Africans Rifles in the extreme right and left, however, fell back in a sudden panic, rescued by one-half company in the front the troops rallied and held their ground under intense fire.

Both the Somali and Yoa performed great in the 6th but on the 7th of October the severity of the fight sunk their spirit and the officers leading the forces complained that they couldn't rely on their men.

Gabriel Ferrand, the Vice-Council of France following these events observed that "Neither the Mahdi nor his chief advisor Ahmed Warsama, better known under the name Haji Sudi, nor the Sultan Nur, leader of the Habr Younis clan were killed or captured.

A reconnaissance patrol led by captain Plunkett was sent by Manning to Galadi where they met the bulk of the dervish forces majority made of Somali Bantu clans of the Makana and Derjele tribes.

John Gough (VC) The bulk of the main dervish forces without their tribal allies moved to Halin in June 1903; according to the intelligence report of the period: "A deserter from the enemy stated that the Mullah.

In comparison, General Egerton's force at Jidbali must have seemed to them a mighty army; and, in very truth, it comprised some of the best seasoned British, Indian, and African troops at the Empire's disposal.

Sending Kenna to the flank of the enemy to block any retreats, Egerton opened his mountain battery guns orderings his troops to kneel or lay down.

In 1906 Eugenio Cappello the Italian council in Aden went with the usual Abdallah Sceri, to the Mullah who told him, openly, that Italy had failed in all the promises made to him by Pestalozza.

In other versions of his dissertations which later were published as a book, he claimed Sultan Nur used the influence of Mohammed Abdullah Hassan to outset his rival Madar Hersi.

The British government armed the Isaaq – the ‘friendlies’ as they were called (Lewis, I. M: The Modem History of Somaliland; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1965) – to fight against Sayyid Mohamed's nationalist movement.

Ismail Mire (circa 1880s-1961) was promoted in the early years of Siad Bare's rule as the commander and lieutenant and right-hand man of the movement replacing Haji Sudi.