In its final report on the crash, the NTSB criticized the Chicago Transit Authority's scheduling policies, which it found contributed to train operators becoming fatigued.

Additionally, the NTSB found that the train stop system at O'Hare station was incorrectly configured.

The CTA responded by revising its scheduling policies and reconfiguring train stops at terminal stations throughout the "L" system.

Passengers enter the station at the end of the platforms via a set of escalators and elevators, located in line with the center track.

[1]: 1, 8 Train 141 departed Logan Square at 2:23 a.m, and the operator reported that she began to feel drowsy near Harlem station.

The operator continued along the route towards O'Hare after adjusting a heater in the train cab in an attempt to stay awake.

The train entered O'Hare station at a normal speed of approximately 25 miles per hour (40 km/h), and was routed onto the center track.

[11] When interviewed by the NTSB, Haywood admitted falling asleep at the controls and disclosed that she had done a similar thing the previous month, which resulted in an overshoot at Belmont (Blue) on February 1.

In addition, Chicago Transit Authority failed to effectively manage the operator’s work schedule to mitigate the risk of fatigue.

Contributing to the severity of the accident was Chicago Transit Authority’s failure to identify the insufficient stopping distance and inadequate speed restriction at the center pocket track at O’Hare Station.