The book begins by inspecting China's historical views on peace and war, international order and compares it to the United States' approach to foreign policy.

Kissinger records his own experiences in coordinating the 1972 Nixon visit, including authentic accounts on the nature of Mao Zedong and personality of Zhou Enlai.

[6] The final part of the book looks to the future of Sino-American relations, critiquing the areas which prevent the US and China from developing a mutually beneficial relationship whilst warning of the consequences of another cold war.

[9] He was awarded a PhD at Harvard in 1954, and swiftly transitioned in to the American political system working with the likes of Nelson Rockefeller, Chester Bowles and Lucius Clay.

[10] He worked with Rockefeller on various projects until 1968, who, impressed with Kissinger's professionalism gave word to Nixon to offer him a role as the president's assistant for National Security Affairs in 1968.

Zachary Keck from E-International Relations wrote "This helps convey the continuity in Chinese foreign policy that, to some degree, hints that there is some predictability in Beijing's actions".

There has been appraisal, criticism and nuanced reviews from a multiplicity of well-known newspapers and journals, which have critiqued Kissinger's perspective, objectivity and content found within his book.

Donald S. Zagoria from Columbia University considered Kissinger's book a "remarkable achievement" which "will certainly add to his reputation as one of America's pre-eminent strategic thinkers".

[1] Oxford University historian Rana Mitter, who specialises in the history of the Republic of China, considered Kissinger's book an erudite and elegant insight into the new world superpower.

The review suggests that those who love diplomatic history will "delight" in the assessment of the misconceptions, mistakes and missed opportunities that fractured the relations between the U.S. and PRC prior to Nixon's historic trip.

[2] Former chief critic for the New York Times Michiko Kakutani regarded Kissinger's On China as a measure to protect his image in the public eye, whilst underplaying the consequences of Chinese leadership on civilians.

[23] A review published by The Economist[24] condemned Kissinger's On China as an inaccurate and problematic piece relating history and decisions of Chinese foreign policy.

The review deduces that Kissinger's book is marred by his flattering picture of Chinese foreign policy, in which it is led by calculated, effective, master strategists.

The review considered Kissinger to be "disappointingly vague"[24] in the final parts of the book where he attempts to answer a question on future of American–Chinese relations: Will China's rise as a superpower inevitably pave a way to conflict with the U.S.?

The review contends that rather than providing a definitive answer on how to avoid the repetition of conflict, Kissinger looks backward to the relationship of Germany and Britain a century ago.

[24] Jasper Becker, a British author and commentator, criticised Kissinger's book for failing to address the key question "why and how did President Richard Nixon decide that it was in America's interests to protect communist China?".

Becker believes China's decision to send troops to Korea, Vietnam, Burma and Cambodia, whilst financing the training of insurgents in other countries, exhibited parallel aggression to the Soviet Union.