[6] Siegel and Kosuga told the growers that they would hold the rest of their inventory in order to support the price of onions.

[8] Siegel and Kosuga made millions of dollars on the transaction due to their short position on onion futures.

[5] At one point, however, 50 pounds (23 kg) of onions were selling in Chicago for less than the bags that held them (effectively, for a negative price).

During the hearings, the Commodity Exchange Authority stated that it was the perishable nature of onions which made them vulnerable to price swings.

The bill was unpopular among traders, some of whom argued that onion shortages were not a crucial issue since they were used as a condiment rather than a staple food.

The other products that were traded, including futures contracts on eggs, turkeys, and potatoes, were not large enough to support the exchange.

[13] This led to the emergence of new leadership who pioneered a different strategy, expanding the exchange's traded products to include futures contracts on pork bellies and frozen concentrate orange juice.

[15] The ban has provided academics with a unique opportunity to study the effect of an active futures market on commodity prices.

[citation needed] Holbrook Working published a study in 1960 which argued that price volatility declined after the futures market for onions was introduced in the 1940s.

This volatility led the son of a farmer who initially lobbied for the ban to advocate a return to onion futures trading.