His guidance to Cầm was to direct his "main effort" on the inexperienced 196th Brigade, just settling in at Tây Ninh, and local territorial and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units.

The remaining battalion of the 272nd was to join the 101st Regiment, a unit of the 7th Division on loan to Cầm, for the third and main effort, the destruction of a Special Forces camp at Suoi Da, 15 km northeast of Tây Ninh City.

Cầm himself intended to accompany the 101st Regiment, a unit that had seen little combat and was unfamiliar with the terrain of War Zone C, to its forward assembly areas near Suoi Da and then to depart to occupy a central position from winch to coordinate all three assaults.

[2]: 34–5 The 196th Light Infantry Brigade, a relatively green unit, along with the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) had arrived in South Vietnam less than two months earlier, on 14 August and September 15, 1966 respectively.

So, when troops of the 25th Division uncovered a large rice cache in the Saigon River corridor about 30 km southeast of Tây Ninh City, Weyand sent some of de Saussure's forces farther east in search of other stockpiles.

On 19 October de Saussure moved one of his battalions to Dầu Tiếng District on the northern edge of the corridor; and had it begin to scour the area, which varied from low, flat terrain and cultivated fields to scrub brush and thick jungle.

Anxious to seize all the depots before the enemy could react in force, on 1 November O'Connor instructed de Saussure to spend only one more day evacuating the rice, to destroy what was left, and then to move north toward the Ba Hao, a stream emptying into the Saigon River 7 km northwest of Dầu Tiếng.

The operation went badly from the start, with no linkup plan, little appreciation of the enemy and terrain, and command and control difficult, the two blocking and four attacking forces quickly became separated from one another, lost in the dense jungle.

Flying overhead, de Saussure spent the rest of the afternoon assisting his battalion commanders as they regrouped their units, evacuated casualties, and brought in extra ammunition, rations, and especially water as the humidity and heat had exhausted the men.

Cầm's diversionary efforts, a carefully planned mortar attack against de Saussure's Tây Ninh Base to the west and a series of determined assaults against Suoi Cao to the south, were both executed during the early hours, further confusing the Americans.

Tây Ninh was spared a ground attack, but damage to the 196th's communications system was extensive, prompting de Saussure himself to make an emergency trip to his base camp.

Having already rushed the division's security platoon and reconnaissance company to block Meloy's advance, Cầm reinforced with the 3rd Battalion of the 101st Regiment, ordering it across the Ba Hao into prepared positions.

Lying in wait a short distance away were the PAVN in mutually supporting bunkers, some made of concrete, and all had thick overhead log coverings and bristled with machine-gun emplacements and camouflaged fighting positions.

Turning to the 196th, he told de Saussure to break contact the next day, assemble all his units in a clearing south of Meloy, and unscramble the companies and return each to its parent organization.

[2]: 42–4  Captain Robert F. Foley commander of Company A, 2/27th Infantry Regiment and Private First Class John F. Baker Jr. of the same unit would each be awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions on 5 November.

Rather than conduct a multi-unit sweep that would take time to develop and would allow the 9th Division to slip into Cambodia, DePuy decided to insert his forces quickly at a point close to the suspected enemy bases in hopes of generating a hasty and unplanned response.

Since taking command of the 1st Division in March, DePuy had concluded that the trick to jungle fighting was to find the enemy with the fewest possible men and destroy him with the maximum amount of firepower.

Experiences during the summer of 1966, most notably the War Zone C battles at Srok Dong and the Minh Thanh Road, in which 1st Division forces had destroyed enemy ambushes with storms of fire, had confirmed for DePuy the wisdom of this approach.

At a climactic moment in the fight, one of those replacements, Captain Eurípides Rubio, realized that a smoke grenade intended to mark the PAVN's position for an incoming air strike had landed perilously close to his own men.

The subsequent discovery, just north of Whitted, of a huge supply complex containing tons of grenades, explosives, mines, food and clothing, made clear why the 101st had attacked.

Finding no trace of the unit, Walker went on to conduct a cordon and search operation at Bến Củi II, a hamlet inside the plantation, which agents had reported as a major VC supply point.

Operations of that sort, which would be used again and again throughout the war, had three objectives: first, to gather intelligence and root out the VC underground; second, to help the Saigon government show concern for the welfare of the people; and third, to search a populated area for weapons and other items of military value.

Although the troops found few weapons and military stores, the joint US-South Vietnamese effort resulted in the capture of twenty-seven VC and the discovery that Bến Củi II was a requisition processing point for COSVN's 82d Rear Service Group.

VC units would send carrying parties to the hamlet with money for the inhabitants to purchase food and supplies in Dầu Tiếng and Tây Ninh City.

He instructed O'Connor to enter War Zone C on the 1st Division's west flank but not to proceed beyond the 80 east-west grid line, 30 km north of Tây Ninh City.

To conserve helicopters for resupply missions, O'Connor ordered the 196th Brigade, upon return to his control on the twelfth, to open the ground route between Tây Ninh and Bau Co.

He had instructed his 101st Regiment to protect the 82nd Rear Service Group's ammunition stores and to fight a delaying action; but the 101st, battling Whitted at Suoi Da on unfamiliar ground, was in full retreat by the afternoon of the 8th.

Turning to the 25th Division, Westmoreland suggested that it make a rapid thrust north with its 2nd Brigade a long Route 4 toward the Cambodian border in an attempt to spark an enemy reaction.

When the change of orders from II Field Force arrived on the 14th, O'Connor instructed the brigade's commander, Colonel Thomas M. Tarpley, to terminate that operation and move north to find COSVN.

Americans often uncovered evidence of hasty departure (i.e. abandoned camps, vacated tunnels, caches of food and supplies) indicating that the PAVN/VC forces had been alerted by the preparations for upcoming search-and-destroy missions.