Consequently, Israel and Egypt ignored United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242, which called for withdrawal from occupied territories in return for Arab recognition, and negotiations between the countries ceased.

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir aimed to maintain the status quo and believed that her country's military strength would secure peace with Arab nations on their terms.

In February, he proposed a phased Israel withdrawal from the Sinai, which would involve a reopening of the Suez Canal, and Israeli fulfillment of the UNSCR 242, including resolving the Palestinian refugee problem.

[10] Simultaneously, Sadat sought to improve Egypt's military capabilities, and in March began the first of four trips to the Soviet Union to obtain arms and munitions to cover those expended in the War of Attrition.

Operation 41 was completed by September 1971, and the following month, Sadat and Sadek flew to Moscow to conclude Egypt's largest arms deal yet, receiving 100 MiG-21 fighters, 10 Tu-16 bombers, SA-6 anti-aircraft (AA) missiles and heavy artillery.

The manually guided Sagger missile had a long range and a powerful warhead but suffered from low velocity in flight, allowing the target (such as a tank) time to take evasive maneuver or return fire.

On 21 August of that year, in complete secrecy, six senior Syrian commanders, using false names and passports, arrived from Latakia at Alexandria harbor in a Soviet passenger liner carrying holiday makers.

This was an important factor in choosing 6 October for an attack; observant Jews fast on that day, abstain from the use of fire or electricity (which meant transportation would be at a standstill), and much of the Israeli army would be demobilised.

Late in 1971, an Egyptian officer suggested the use of small, light, gasoline fueled pumps that could be ferried across the canal in inflatable rafts to blast through the sand barrier by hydraulic mining.

The main obstacle of these defences was a massive artificial sand wall erected by Israeli engineers, 18–25 meters (59–82 ft) high with a 45–60 degree incline, along the entire Suez Canal.

The 1967 preemptive victory was so complete and won so cheaply, Israelis viewed their military forces as invincible, their intelligence service as unmatched, and their Arab foes as inferior and incapable.

Egyptian intelligence planted false stories of his illness in the press and initiated a search for a home in Europe, where Sadat would receive treatment, adding to the rumor's credibility.

Egyptian commanders were taken completely by surprise, when, beginning late evening on 4 October, Soviet experts serving with field units, embassy personnel and their families were hurriedly evacuated.

[57][58][59] 4 October also provided another worrying incident to Egyptian commanders, who became aware that evening that EgyptAir, the country's national airline, had canceled all its flights and was arranging the protection of its civil air fleet by dispersing its aircraft to refuges outside Egypt.

[65] However, there remained too many signs for the Israelis to ignore, chief among which was the hasty Soviet evacuation from Cairo and Damascus, and the constant buildup of forces on the Syrian front when Egypt, it was assumed, would not enter war.

As the Israelis expected the attack to begin four hours later, only part of the troops and none of the armor assigned to man the Bar Lev Line were in position, except for a few platoons in the northernmost forts.

[42] The operation began with a major air strike involving more than 200 aircraft against three airbases, Hawk SAM batteries, three command centers, artillery positions and several radar stations, employing MiG-21s, MiG-17s, and Su-7s.

This allowed the Egyptian Air Force to operate for the rest of the war without any ground-based communications interference, as the only other jamming center in the Sinai was located at el-Arish, considerably behind the front.

The sand rampart that lined the entire Suez Canal did not exist in the Bitter Lakes, and there were no Israeli defences or units to be encountered, and the brigade reached the opposite bank around 14:40 without any losses.

Tactical errors also showcased themselves when Reshef moved his tank brigade forward; Israeli commanders neglected to conduct reconnaissance beforehand, causing their units to fall into Egyptian ambushes.

[79] At the same time, engineers began operating their water pumps against the sand wall, opening the first passage in less than an hour, and the Egyptians moved up their bridging units to the canal.

A Sa'iqa company cut off the only route to the fort for reinforcements, while a battalion attacked from Port Fouad, advancing along a narrow strip of land bereft of natural cover.

As the magnitude of Israeli losses became clear, Gonen made the decision at noon to form a defensive line on the Lateral Road, 30 kilometers (19 mi) east of the canal, and ordered his divisional commanders to deploy accordingly.

[106] Air strikes continued throughout the day, and Southern Command received optimistic reports during the afternoon from the IAF, which claimed seven bridges knocked out of action, with the remaining ones to be destroyed by evening.

[106][116] At the conference, in light of the little information available on Egyptian dispositions and intentions, and due to a shortage of infantry and artillery, the commanders agreed they could not relieve the surrounded strongpoints on the canal in the near future.

Meanwhile, Sharon left Tasa and headed for Suez City, leaving a single reconnaissance company to hold vital ridges such as Hamadia and Kishuf, but not the hills to the north, such as Hamutal.

Estimating, correctly, that the attack would come be directed between his two forward brigades, the weakest point in his lines, Abu Sa'ada planned to draw Israeli forces into his bridgehead to within three kilometers of the canal before engaging them from all sides, committing all his anti-tank reserves.

In a press conference at night on 8 October, not knowing that the counteroffensive had been defeated, Elazar claimed that the destruction of the Egyptian Army was underway, and that the IDF would soon "break their [the Arabs military personnel's] bones."

[148] While Meir and the Israeli Labor Party won the elections held in late-December, the release of the Agranat Commission's findings in April 1974 and its failure to accuse the nation's political leadership of any shortcomings—while recommending the dismissal of several senior officers—led to widespread public outrage.

This unprecedented willingness, coupled with Sadat's diplomatic initiatives and intercession by the United States to break barriers of mistrust between Egypt and Israel, made possible the long series of discussions between both nations.