[7][8] Pakistan came under increasing criticism[9] from India, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe as the plight of the refugees and their impact on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in the UN and on a number of global tours.
[10] However, the United States and China showed little interest in the situation and actively opposed aid, intervention or support to the Mukti Bahini[11][12] (possibly fearing advancement of Soviet influence deep into South Asia[9]).
On 9 August 1971, India signed a twenty-year cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union[13] in which each promised military support to the other in the event it was attacked.
[14] By October 1971, the Mukti Bahini had started launching massive raids deep into East Pakistan, with active support from the Indian Army beginning in November.
Regular Indian Army troops engaged and mauled Pakistani armour at Garibpur,[16] during which the two intruding Pakistan Air Force jets were shot down and another badly damaged in the Battle of Boyra while offensive manoeuvres were launched in Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border.
[17] It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run.
[18] This policy made the assumptions that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table.
[citation needed] The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions.
A second objective for the PAF was to conduct air interdiction against the supply routes for the Indian troops opposing Khan's proposed offensive, but these were accorded as secondary targets to be engaged after the operation started.
[22] The PAF had also positioned mobile radar and pre-stocked forward airfields in the proposed battle area to support the planned attack.
However, by now, a major part of II Corps, 33 Division, had been broken up to reinforce Pakistani units against Indian offensives elsewhere.
Trains carrying equipment of 1 Division were unloaded, and II Corps, with its units on both sides of the Sutlej, settled in to await orders.
However, due to the "freeze" order, they remained on the Pakistan side of the border and were unable to cross before the cease-fire came into effect at 2000 hours on the same day.
[25] Pakistan's failure to launch the offensive in a timely manner has generated great controversy among subsequent commentators.
[citation needed] Hakimullah's flight was armed with two 500 kg bombs each, which the strike used efficiently hitting the first 300m of the runway and cratering it enough to leave it nonoperational for several hours.
A second strike of two F-104 Starfighters, led by Wing Commander Amjad H Khan hit the P-35 radar station at Amritsar, rendering it inoperable for nearly an hour.
[5] Within forty-five minutes of these strikes, Pakistani troops had shelled India's western frontier and were reported to have crossed the border at Punch in the state of Jammu.
Like Ambala, Agra Airbase, which lay deepest among the PAF's targets that evening, was struck by a two-plane B-57 formation led by Wg.
Through the night the Indian Air Force also struck the main East Pakistani airfields of Tejgaon, and later Kurmitola.
At the same time, the Indian Air Force was deploying additional aircraft to its forward airfields for the strikes that were to follow the next morning.
[31] Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors.USIS Text, pp 1–2.