They were instigated by the Director of Borneo Operations (DOBOPS) Major General Walter Walker with the agreement of the British and Malaysian governments.

However, it was important not to cause the Indonesians to lose face and possibly escalate the conflict, or to enable Indonesia to present evidence of 'imperialist aggression', so Claret operations were highly classified and never publicised, although it seems that some British journalists were aware of what transpired.

Operation Claret was largely successful in gaining the initiative for the British Commonwealth forces, inflicting significant casualties on the Indonesians and keeping them on the defensive, before being suspended late in the war.

[3] The border between East Malaysia and Kalimantan was not well defined and 22 Special Air Service reconnaissance patrols seem to have liberally interpreted its inexactitude from late 1963 or early 1964.

However, in July 1964 the new Labour government in London approved cross-border offensive operations to a depth of 5,000 yards (4,600 m) by both special forces and infantry under the code-name Claret.

DOBOPS added additional conditions, seven 'Golden Rules': Claret operations were only publicly disclosed by Britain in 1974, whilst the Australian government did not officially acknowledge its involvement until 1996.

They outline 'contacts' in a way that implies they took place in East Malaysia but provide a grid reference, from which those south of the border can be identified with the aid of a 1:50,000 scale map.

[8] They included at least one 'permanent' Claret task, an artillery position (gun and observation post) astride the border ridge with authority to fire at any identifiable Indonesian forces inside Indonesia.

Infantry tasks included fighting patrols inside Indonesia looking for opportunity 'contacts', attacks on Indonesian positions and ambushing tracks and rivers.

As experience and the situation developed these changed, and the Golden Rules on preparation and rehearsal, and the definition of thwarting offensive action relaxed.

Their depth was also affected by the threat of interception while withdrawing, greater when the Indonesian troop density was higher as it was in the areas south of Kuching.

Fire support for Claret operations was mostly provided by artillery and, if the target was close to the border and in range, infantry mortars.

The reconnaissance and intelligence gathering activities of the Border Scouts, mostly trained by 22 SAS, are unclear (apart from their accompanying many infantry patrols).

The Reconnaissance Platoon of the Gordon Highlanders (a battalion with some 10 months in Borneo) left a company base at Long Pa Sia in the 4th Division of Sarawak, established an ambush, which was sprung after several days leaving some 5 Indonesians killed.

In late 1965 intelligence reported the existence of a previously unknown base in the estuarine area west of Tawau at the eastern end of the Border.

This operation was an artillery ambush from Ba Kelalan in the 5th Division of Sarawak by 1/7 Gurkhas and 38 Light Battery on a track leading to the Long Bawang airfield.