Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) and units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), originally planned as a sweep of western Dinh Tuong Province and eastern Kien Phong Province, however with the outbreak of the Tet Offensive on 31 January 1968 it instead became the MRF reaction to eject Vietcong (VC) forces from Mỹ Tho and Vĩnh Long.
[1]: 148 Shortly before the beginning of the 3-day cease-fire declared by the government of South Vietnam to celebrate Tết, the lunar new year, the MRF was ordered to the western portion of Dinh Tuong Province and the eastern part of Kien Phong Province to attack VC Base Area 470 and to prevent the VC from using communication routes running east and southeast through the area.
The MRF planned to establish bases along the waterways to provide fire support as it had done during Operation Coronado IX in the preceding November and December.
Three CH-47 helicopters were used to set down the artillery on the agroville site and the battery was ready to fire by 18:00 on 29 January 1968, the beginning of the Tết truce.
At about 10:00 on 30 January, the MRF was informed that the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) had cancelled Tết truce because of VC attacks on towns and cities in the northern three Corps.
The MRF was directed to resume offensive operations "with particular attention to the defense of the Headquarters complexes, logistical installations, airfields, population centers and billets."
[1]: 148–9 [2]: 360–1 On 31 January the VC attacked 13 of the 16 provincial capitals in the Mekong Delta and captured large sections of Mỹ Tho, Cai Lậy, Bến Tre, Cái Bè and Vĩnh Long.
COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland directed Weyand to send whatever elements of the 9th Infantry Division in III Corps that he could spare to join Colonel Burt A. David’s 2nd Brigade and the MRF without delay.
[2]: 367 Before the Cái Bè landing could be executed, orders were changed by Eckhardt and the MRF was diverted to Mỹ Tho where Allied forces were still heavily engaged.
A VC sapper team had broken into the home of General Nguyễn Viết Thanh, the commander of the ARVN 7th Division, who had spent the night at his headquarters.
Fighting was intense as the city had to be cleared slowly and systematically; pockets of resistance had to be wiped out to prevent the VC from closing in behind allied troops.
On the way the lead elements or Company E also met intense fire and were eventually pinned down at the western edge of Mỹ Tho.
The 3/60th Infantry, continued its movement north advancing under heavy VC fire and air strikes were requested at 17:40 to assist the battalion's forward elements.
Throughout the night sporadic sniper fire and occasional grenade attacks were directed against the Allied forces but no major engagements developed.
Upon completion of the sweep, the city was cleared of VC units and the MRF battalions loaded onto Armored Troop Carriers (ATCs) at 12:01 for redeployment to Cai Lậy District in Dinh Tuong Province.
The MRF therefore moved the 25 km from Mỹ Tho to the Cai Lậy area to cut off VC escape routes from eastern Dinh Tuong Province.
There were no significant engagements during the following two days as the VC apparently remained close to Mỹ Tho and did not immediately withdraw to their normal base areas.
[2]: 364 A VC mortar and sapper attack hit the Vĩnh Long Airfield which was defended by pilots and maintenance personnel from HA(L)-3, Detachment 3.
[2]: 364 The defenders held out until the morning when the ARVN 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived and cleared the outer perimeter of the airfield.
[3]: 302–3 On the 31st, the ARVN 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry attempted to clear Vĩnh Long’s main street but was stalled by machine-gun fire and Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
The 3/60th Infantry, completed the first airlift by 16:55 with no opposition, but at 17:33, on the east bank of the Rach Ca Tre Company A began to receive sniper fire.
During the remaining hours of darkness on 4 February the 3/60th Infantry, continued to engage the VC in a fight that subsided gradually, Companies A and C were low on ammunition and required resupply.
Popular Forces troops at a nearby outpost revealed that a large VC unit was in the woods and along the stream approximately 500m south of the bridge.
At 11:00 the lead element of Monitors and ASPBs received fire from automatic weapons, recoilless rifles and RPGs on both banks of the river.
Company B, supported by artillery, gunships and fire from the river craft assaulted the west bank of the Rach Cai Cam just north of the area of the ambush and swept south.
Men of Company A observed 20 VC in the river to their west, apparently trying to escape and called in artillery fire that caused several secondary explosions.
Shortly thereafter, at 17:00 all three companies received heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire from the wooded streamline in front of them and became heavily engaged.
[3]: 308 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History.