Operation Eastern Exit was the codename given to the military evacuation of the United States embassy in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in January 1991.

In late December 1990, violence quickly enveloped the city as armed militants began clashing with government soldiers.

On 1 January 1991, the US Ambassador to Somalia, James Keough Bishop, contacted the Department of State requesting an evacuation of the embassy, which was approved the following day.

In total, Operation Eastern Exit evacuated 281 (with a 282nd born aboard ship) diplomats and civilians from 30 countries, including 12 heads of missions (eight ambassadors and four chargés d'affaires).

In the late 1980s, there was increasing rebellion against the rule of Somali President Siad Barre, a military dictator[3][4][5] who maintained tight control of power and had a record of human rights abuses.

"[7]: 85  Ambassador Bishop understood from his past experiences in Beirut and Liberia the importance of being prepared to deal with emergencies and spent the afternoon working with military experts to review the embassy's Emergencies and Evacuation (E&E) plan until he was "satisfied...that [Central Command] realized that it might have to conduct an evacuation from Mogadishu and was prepared to do that.

By 19 December, the number of official US personnel in the city was reduced from 147 to 37;[2]: 2  around the same time, fighting between the government and rebels came within about 64 kilometres (40 mi) of Mogadishu.

[7]: 93 On 30 December, violence escalated "an order of magnitude"[11] as militants entered Mogadishu, which was quickly enveloped by a general state of lawlessness.

[2]: 9 [12] Ambassador Bishop had spent a considerable amount of time discussing contingency plans for evacuation with other diplomatic posts.

[7]: 94–95 Ambassador Bishop had visited Central Command in August 1990, where he worked with military experts to update the embassy's E&E plan.

[6][7]: 94  Soon after the evacuation request, the United States Air Force deployed C-130 transport planes and an AC-130, for gunfire support, to Nairobi, Kenya, awaiting clearances to enter Somalia and the ability to safely transfer evacuees from the embassy to the airport.

[11] It also became apparent that the rebels had an ineffective command-and-control structure, making it impossible to negotiate any ceasefire or guarantee of safe passage.

[7]: 95  Ambassador Bishop made an urgent request to Washington for two platoons of soldiers to parachute into the embassy to defend it until the ships arrived.

[2]: 12–13  Although the two vessels were selected by mid-afternoon on 2 January, the transfer of some personnel from Dubai to Masirah and a decision to refuel the two ships (again, due to the potential risk of an extended operation like Sharp Edge) delayed departure by about ten hours.

Aboard Guam, a warrant officer who had previously served as a Marine Security Guard (MSG) at the Mogadishu embassy during the mid-1980s was found.

After receiving updated information, task force commanders determined that a beach landing, requiring troops to fight their way across the city, was too risky.

[2]: 3, 16–17 [7]: 98 On the evening of 4 January, the final execute order was issued for a 02:45[a] launch of two CH-53E Super Stallions to arrive at the embassy at dawn.

[2]: 19, 22 Two CH-53E Super Stallions carrying a 60-man security detail—51 Marines and nine Navy SEALs—departed Guam at 02:47, 466 nautical miles (863 km; 536 mi) from the embassy, and were expected to arrive at 06:20.

[2]: 23  The helicopters arrived in Mogadishu at dawn, crossing the coast just south of the harbor at 25–50 feet (7.6–15.2 m) in altitude on a route that was planned to avoid areas of more intense violence reported in the northern parts of the city.

[6][2]: 3, 23–26 The security detail moved to establish a perimeter around the embassy compound and the Air Force's AC-130 arrived to provide overhead support.

[2]: 24  Ambassador Bishop gave the security detail clear instructions on the rules of engagement: they could only use deadly force if people came over the embassy compound's walls with obvious hostile intent.

[2]: 28  To this effect, he requested the Voice of America and BBC broadcast announcements that the forces were present only to evacuate the embassy and would not interfere in the conflict.

A convoy of vehicles with several Marines and SEALs left the embassy at 8:47 and returned ten minutes later with 22 persons from the OMC (four Americans, a Filipino, and 17 Kenyans).

[12][2]: 29  The brother of President Barre, who was also a Major General and Chief of Police, showed up at the embassy in the afternoon with 25 members of his family requesting to be evacuated, but was turned away after a vocal conversation with the ambassador.

A 44-person force consisting primarily of Marines to handle the ECC was planned for insertion with the CH-53E Super Stallions after they had returned to the Guam.

Meanwhile, the Marines were allowed to consume anything they wanted from the embassy's commissary, such as candy, sodas, and souvenirs (most had been stationed on ships for several months).

[2]: 33  As the second wave landed, Major Siad arrived at the embassy gate accompanied by two truckloads of soldiers and held a grenade in one hand and a radio in the other.

Major Siad demanded that the evacuation cease immediately because the Somali government had not granted the US permission to carry out such a military operation.

The final wave departed the embassy at 1:49 and landed on Guam at 2:23; twenty minutes later, Ambassador Bishop declared the evacuation complete.

Except the introduction, the article Evacuating Somalia is a verbatim excerpt, with some short omissions (denoted by ellipses) from pages 94–104 the document Ambassador James K. Bishop, Jr. (both were published by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training).