In the West the defeat in Normandy and the Allied advance across Western Europe had significant consequences for the Luftwaffe's ability to defend Germany from British night attacks.

Along with the battlefield reverses was the inability of the Luftwaffe to produce enough experienced night fighter crews which was exacerbated by the crippling shortage of fuel at this stage in the war which contributed to the collapse of training programs and grounded combat units.

The Germans waited for an opportunity to begin the intruder operation and one presented itself on the night of the 3/4 March 1945, when Bomber Command attacked targets in western Germany.

Faced with German domination of the continent, the only weapon the British could use to exert immediate military pressure on Germany was the night bombing operations of RAF Bomber Command.

The lack of airborne radar at this stage in the war meant finding and destroying Allied bombers at night was a difficult prospect, thus it was decided to use the Fernnachtjagd in operations over Britain.

[16] Major Kuhlmann, head of the wireless telegraphy interception service played a significant part in assisting the Luftwaffe night fighter force as did Wolfgang Martini's Luftnachrichtentruppe (Air Signal Corps).

Intercepting British signal communications by monitoring the radio traffic of enemy ground stations and aircraft the Germans could determine where and at what airfields RAF night activity was occurring.

British ground defences, which had taken their toll on the German units in 1940, were now side-stepped by a decision to shift the area of operations to the North Sea, by the English coast.

A high number of crashes owed much to nervous British bomber pilots who did not feel safe over their own airfields and consequently landed too hard and fast, or refused to go around a second time for fear of enemy intruders.

Hitler was also reticent owing the fact there had been no noticeable reduction in British air raids and the RAF had not adopted these methods during The Blitz.

[27][28] To increase the toll on Allied bombers further, intruder operations restarted briefly in August 1943 and took place intermittently or on the initiative of single crews, since no organised Fernnachtjagd existed after October 1941.

Paradoxically, production was able to replace the relatively small losses and operational serviceability reached an all-time high since ground crews had more opportunity to work on machines.

The Luftwaffe was still capable of taking a toll on Bomber Command on occasion, but unless more powerful radars and communications could be introduced in time it was doubtful British air superiority at night could be challenged.

[38] The impotence of the night fighter force as an organisation was demonstrated during the attack on Dresden when the second wave of Allied bombers was hardly opposed.

In October 1944, he finally won support from Werner Streib, Inspekteur der Nachtjagd (Inspector of Night Fighters) to press for an operation again.

Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer—who was to the end the war as the most successful night fighter ace on 121 aerial victories—was said to have attempted to gain support for a like-minded offensive.

To avoid enemy radar raiders were told to fly at minimum altitude and then climb to 4,500 metres (14,800 feet) as they reached the coast, generally believed to be the average operating height of British bombers.

On 1 January 1945, after participating in Operation Bodenplatte to support the German Ardennes Offensive, a Ju 88 (code D5+PT) flown by Unteroffizier (Corporal) Lattoch belonging to 9./NJG 3 landed at Luxembourg in error.

All bomber and fighter groups were linked by telephone and ground control passed on all details of intruder operations to pilots including height and heading when they occurred.

The clouds made it difficult for pilots to see and steer clear of zones heavily guarded by Allied ground defences near to the frontline.

1 Group Lancaster was shot down by a NJG 3 Ju 88 night fighter patrolling the Kattegat near Denmark; Major Werner Husemann achieved his 33rd air victory in this action which was confirmed through British records.

11 Group sent 12 Handley Page Halifax bombers and four Short Stirlings which formed a Mandrel Screen to jam long-range Freya and Würzburg radar.

It is likely, after several months, unit officers did not remember the significance of the name and it took time for the crews to recall that it signified the offensive air patrol they were briefed about in late 1944.

Crews were forbidden to engage enemy aircraft over the North Sea in order to preserve surprise until the last possible moment.

The strain on the crews was enormous, as a careful vigil was kept on them until the British coast was reached and the pilot began his ascent to the height of the returning bomber stream.

A "scram" order was also issued to bomber units still airborne; it signified a warning to number crews that intruders were in the vicinity and they were to divert to airfields in western or southern England, and out of danger.

Eight minutes later Heinrich Conze, also of NJG 5, attempted to attack a car driven by Royal Observer Corps member Mr J P Kelway.

Over Pocklington Johann Dreher and his crew attempted to attack a landing Halifax and then a taxi that had its headlights on and was travelling along a parallel road near the airfield.

[66][67][68] British records list the loss of 15 Handley Page Halifax and 12 Avro Lancaster four-engine bombers which made up the vast majority of casualties.

The decision not to continue intruder operations, in their view, allowed the British to build their bomber force virtually unhindered for over four years.