[7] The specially selected raiders extensively trained and rehearsed the operation at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, while planning and intelligence gathering continued from 25 May to 20 November 1970.

[5][10][11] Criticism of the failure to detect the removal of the POWs prior to the raid, both public and within the administration of Richard Nixon, led to a major reorganization of the United States intelligence community a year later.

An Air Force intelligence unit concluded through analysis of aerial photography that a compound near Sơn Tây, suspected since late 1968 of being a prisoner of war camp, contained 55 American POWs and that at least six were in urgent need of rescue.

Manor set up an Air Force training facility at Eglin's Duke Field and brought together a 27-member planning staff that included 11 from the prior feasibility study.

[29] The planning staff set up parameters for a nighttime raid, the key points of which were clear weather and a quarter moon at 35 degrees above the horizon for optimum visibility during low-level flight.

[15] Training proceeded on Range C-2 at Eglin using an exact but crudely made replica of the prison compound for rehearsals[30][n 11] and a $60,000 five-foot-by-five-foot scale table model (codenamed "Barbara") for familiarization.

[38] On that date, the first full-scale dress rehearsal, using a UH-1H as the assault helicopter, was conducted at night and included a 5.5-hour, 687 miles (1,106 km) flight of all aircraft, replicating the timing, speeds, altitudes and turns in the mission plan.

[39] The rehearsal spelled the end of the option to use the UH-1 when its small passenger compartment resulted in leg cramps to the Special Forces troopers that completely disrupted the timing of their assault, more than offsetting the UH-1's only advantage (smaller rotor radius) over the larger HH-3.

[42] Manor and Simons met with the commander of Task Force 77, Vice Admiral Frederic A. Bardshar, aboard his flagship USS America on 5 November to arrange for a diversionary mission to be flown by naval aircraft.

[45][n 18] The Special Forces personnel arrived in Thailand at 03:00 local time 18 November[n 19] and later that date President Nixon approved execution of the mission, setting in motion the final phase, Operation Kingpin.

The presence of the cold front, however, indicated that conditions in the objective area on 20 November would be good and possibly acceptable over Laos for navigation of the low-level penetration flights.

[49] Three theater lift C-130s previously staged at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield arrived at Takhli to transport the Army contingent and helicopter crews to Udorn RTAFB and the A-1 pilots to Nakhon Phanom.

[50] The fifty-six Special Forces troopers selected to conduct the raid were flown from Takhli to their helicopter staging base at Udorn RTAFB by C-130 on the evening of 20 November.

Each Combat Talon crew cross-trained to assume the role of the other, but the assault formation was required to have a navigation leader with four fully functioning engines all the way to the objective.

[64] The flight path was a corridor 6 miles (9.7 km) wide, the width required for safe terrain clearance in the event of formation breakup or the loss of drafting position by a helicopter.

[70][n 33] Starting at 01:52, 20 A-7 Corsairs and A-6 Intruders, flying in pairs at stepped-up altitudes to deconflict their flight paths, entered North Vietnamese airspace on three tracks,[61] dropping flares to simulate an attack.

The pilots of Apple 03, the gunship helicopter preceding the others, observed a compound nearly identical to the prison camp in size and layout (previously labeled a "secondary school" by intelligence sources) and steered toward it, followed by the assault lift force.

[80] Despite the error and trees taller than briefed that forced a steeper descent than rehearsed, the assault team crash-landed into the courtyard of Sơn Tây prison at 02:19[61][n 40] with all weapons firing.

Although one raider, acting as a door gunner, was thrown from the aircraft,[81][n 41] the only casualty was the helicopter's flight engineer, whose ankle was fractured by a dislodged fire extinguisher.

[82][n 43] Also at 02:19,[61] Apple 01 (after its pilots saw Banana fire on the first location) landed the Greenleaf support group outside the south side of the secondary school, thinking it to be the target prison compound.

The support group attacked the location with small arms and hand grenades in an eight-minute firefight, after which Simons estimated that 100 to 200 hostile soldiers had been killed.

The Redwine security group, including ground force commander Sydnor, landed at 02:20[61] outside Sơn Tây prison and immediately executed the previously rehearsed contingency plan.

[5][87][n 48] Pathfinders clearing the extraction landing zone blew up an electrical tower that blacked out the entire west side of Sơn Tây including the prison area.

[61] Before the first helicopter arrived, a truck convoy approached the prison from the south, but was stopped by two Redwine security teams that each fired an M72 light antitank weapon into the lead vehicle.

[88][n 49] At 02:28,[61] Cherry 02's electronic warfare operator noted that Fan Song fire control radars for North Vietnamese SA-2 SAM sites had gone active.

Apple 04 reported that an air-to-air missile had been launched at it and missed, but this was later found to have been aerial rockets fired into a hillside by one of the A-1 escorts, jettisoning ordnance to increase maneuverability as a result of the erroneous MiG call.

[96] The crew of the damaged F-105 was compelled to eject over northern Laos, thirty minutes after being hit and within sight of its tanker, when its engine flamed out from lack of fuel.

A mission with Camp Faith as the objective required a lengthy delay for a new window of acceptable conditions,[105][n 57] which increased the chance of security compromise and further withheld personnel and equipment from their parent commands.

[109] As early as the Polar Circle feasibility group, which conducted its capability assessment at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Arlington Hall facility rather than the Pentagon, members of the rescue operation were isolated from contact with outside organizations and closely monitored to prevent accidental leaks to the curious that might irreparably harm security.

[115][116] The intensity of the criticism, and leaks of information including reports of the operation, caused the Nixon Administration to reorganize both the military communications network and the government's intelligence apparatus.