[citation needed] After the postponement of the session of the National Assembly of Pakistan, the High Command was authorised by the Yahya administration to launch the military operation (codename: Searchlight and Barisal) in March 1971 in a view of curbing political opposition instigated by the Awami League– which had won majority in the 1970 elections,[6] and would have formed next civilian government of Pakistan had the Army not intervened.

[10] After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmad met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April 1971 and asked for all possible aid,[11] by which time the Indian government had already opened the Indian-East Pakistan border and the Border Security Force (BSF) was offering aid to the Bengali resistance.

The Bangladeshi government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on 17 April at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. M. A. G. Osmani as commander of the Mukti Bahini (regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad.

[7] On 15 May, Indian Army Eastern Command took over the task of training and supplying the Mukti Bahini; this was aided by the support teams of BSF.

At the beginning stage of the Jackpot, the operation was crucial in sustaining the activities of the Mukti Bahini, which had engaged in a series of insurgent attacks and sabotage all over (then) East Pakistan, and their success debunked the Yahya administration's claims of successfully establishing peace and stability in the Eastern region, as news of the insurgency was picked up and publicized by the international press.

[4] Despite limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport network, availability of supplies, differences of opinion of guerrilla training methods and the decision of the Bangladeshi government to train the maximum number of guerrillas in the shortest possible time,[13] Which may have caused supply shortages and often arming of only 40% to 50% of the newly trained guerrillas with firearms,[14] The Bangladeshi government in exile managed to field 30,000 regular troops and 100,000 guerrillas and run a campaign that would destroy or damage at least 231 bridges, perform 122 acts of sabotage on railway lines and 90 electric stations,[15] disrupting the logistical/supply system of the Pakistani forces, and kill at least 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3,559 soldiers of the regular army during April to November 1971,[16] and an unspecified number of Police, West Pakistan Rangers, EPCAF and Razakar members, and wound several thousand soldiers.

[13] At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal, the Pakistani Army and Pakistan Navy had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas and set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces.

He planned to send 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month with 3/4 weeks of training to hit all targets of opportunity, while building up the regular force to seize territory in Sylhet,[18][19] Indian officials suggested fielding a force of 8,000 guerrillas with regular troops in leadership positions with three or four months of training.

Col. Osmani's initial strategy of sending 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month since July and hitting the border outposts[22] with regular battalions had not yielded expected results for various reasons.

[24][25] As the pace of military operations in Bangladesh slacked off, civilian morale was adversely affected,[26] which prompted East Pakistan administrative authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal".

In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations: (1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando), and (2) the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on 15 August, which became known in Bangladesh and international media as "Operation Jackpot".

[30] Rear admiral Mohammad Shariff had only 4 gunboats (PNS Comilla, Rajshahi, Jessore and Sylhet) and a patrol boat (PNS Balaghat) in East Pakistan, while the navy remodeled 17 civilian ships into gunboats by adding 12.7/20 mm guns, and .30/.50 caliber Browning machine guns.

Major Jalil, Colonel M. A. G. Osmani and Indian Commander Bhattachariya in collaboration with top regional commanders, established the secret camp, codenamed C2P, in Plassey, West Bengal, on 23 May to train volunteers selected from various Mukti Bahini sectors (Bangladesh was divided into 11 operational sectors for Mukti Bahini operations) for this purpose.

Information on river tides, weather and East Pakistani naval infrastructure and deployment was collected through the Mukti Bahini.

A pair of songs was played on India Radio (Akashbani) at specific times to convey the intended signal for commencing the operations.

Tightened security prevented any operations in Chittagong after the first week of October,[44] while four attempts to damage the Hardinge Bridge failed.

[48] Naval commandos managed to sink or damage 126 ships/coasters/ferries during that time span, while one source confirms at least 65 vessels of various types (15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river craft by November 1971)[49] had been sunk between August–November 1971.

At least 100,000 tons of shipping were sunk or crippled, jetties and wharves were disabled and channels blocked, and the commandos kept East Pakistan in a state of siege without having a single vessel.

9, had obtained permission from Premier Tajuddin Ahmed to form a naval unit in August[52] and had requested four gunboats to Commander M. N. Samanth.

Bangladesh Government in Exile, State Minister Captain Kamruzzaman was present when the boats were commissioned by Kolkata Port Trust chairman P. K. Sen. Lt.

After Pakistan launched air attacks on India on 3 December, the Indian Army crossed the border into Bangladesh.