This was the second major military standoff between India and Pakistan following the successful detonation of nuclear devices by both countries in 1998, the first being the Kargil War of 1999.

[13][14][15] Farooq Abdullah the then chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir state urged India to launch a war against militant training camps across the border in Pakistan.

[18] Towards the end of the protracted military standoff, in a surreptitious operation, India's Jat Regiment occupied a strategically important mountain peak on the Pakistani side of the LoC near Dras, Point 5070, and subsequently rechristened it Balwan.

In consequence, the Pakistani army dispensed its entire chain of command, including the Pakistani Brigade Commander and GOC of the Northern Areas over the loss of this peak, while their Indian counterpart Lt. Gen. Deepak Summanwar was felicitated with an Uttam Yudh Seva Medal as a recognition of India's complete domination of the boundary area near Dras.

Advani claimed, "we have received some clues about yesterday's incident, which shows that a neighboring country, and some terrorist organizations active there are behind it",[21] in an indirect reference to Pakistan and Pakistan-based militant groups.

The spokesman for the Pakistani military's public media wing (ISPR), Major-General Rashid Qureshi, said that the attack on the Indian parliament was a result of India's efforts to start a conflict with Pakistan, claiming that "Those [Indians] who can kill thousands of defenseless people in Kashmir can resort to such tactics to gain international sympathy.

[24] The Indian codename for the mobilisation was Operation Parakram[25] The troop deployment to India's western border was expected to take three to four weeks, accordingly, the military action involving a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in Pak administered Kashmir was planned by the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security for the second week of January 2002.

Special forces of the Indian Army would then launch a limited ground offensive to further neutralize the terrorist camps and help to occupy the dominant positions on the LoC.

[26] In late December, both countries moved ballistic missiles closer to each other's border, and mortar and artillery fire was reported in Kashmir.

[27] By January 2002, India had mobilized around 500,000 troops and three armored divisions on Pakistan's border, concentrated along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

[28] India initiated its diplomatic offensive by recalling Indian high commissioner and the civilian flights from Pakistan were banned.

[26] Pakistan picked up the war signals and began mobilization of its military and initiated diplomatic talks with US President George W. Bush.

In the first week of January, British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited India with a message that he was pressurizing Pakistani President Musharraf.

[29] The Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee though skeptic of the seriousness of Musharraf's pledges, decided not to carry out the military attack planned for 14 January.

A limited military action similar to the one planned in January was not considered viable as Pakistan had strengthened its forces on the LoC.

Indian military favored an offensive along the Indo-Pak border that will stretch the Pakistani troops and provide India access to Pakistan administered Kashmir.

The Indian Air Force along with the 1 Strike Corps of India would initiate an attack in Shakargarh bulge to engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) that was spread from Muzaffarabad to Lahore.

[36] There was also concern that a 6 June 2002 asteroid explosion over Earth, known as the Eastern Mediterranean Event, could have caused a nuclear conflict had it exploded over India or Pakistan.

In the diplomacy that followed, Bush, Putin, Blair and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi requested Vajpayee to avoid taking the extreme step.

[38] Restraint was urged by the global community as there were fears that Pakistan would proceed to use its nuclear weapons in the face to counter its conventional asymmetry as compared to the Indian armed forces.

Pakistan's nuclear threats led to US Secretary of State Powell contacting Musharraf at five occasions in the last week of May and reading the riot act.

[26] On 29 July 2002 for the first time after the end of the Kargil war, India used air power to attack positions held by the Pakistani forces at Loonda Post on the Indian side of the Line of Control in the Machil sector.

The forward trenches prepared by Indian troops in earlier years were also occupied by the Pakistani forces and 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers were used to hit them.

[39] Towards the end of the protracted military standoff, in a surreptitious operation, India's Jat Regiment occupied a strategically important mountain peak on the Pakistani side of the LoC near Dras, Point 5070, and subsequently rechristened it Balwan.

In consequence, the Pakistani army dispensed its entire chain of command, including the Pakistani Brigade Commander and GOC of the Northern Areas, over the loss of this peak, while their Indian counterpart Lt. Gen. Deepak Summanwar was felicitated with an Uttam Yudh Seva Medal as a recognition of India's domination of the boundary area near Dras.

At 1:30 pm on 2 August, IAF's LGB capable Mirage 2000 H fighter aircraft loaded with laser-guided weapons bombed the Pakistani bunkers located in the Kel.

[48][49] On 5 November 2011, former Indian naval chief, Admiral Sushil Kumar, claimed that operation Parakram lacked clear objectives.