Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns Unternehmen Paula (Undertaking or Operation Paula)[3][4] is the German codename given for the Second World War Luftwaffe offensive operation to destroy the remaining units of the Armée de l'Air (ALA), or French Air Force during the Battle of France in 1940.

To complete the defeat of France, the Germans undertook a second phase operation, Fall Rot (Case Red), to conquer the remaining regions.

The Luftwaffe was ordered to destroy the French Air Forces, while still providing support to the German Army.

For the operation, the Germans committed five Air Corps to the attack, comprising 1,100 aircraft.

British intelligence had warned the French of the impending attack, and the operation failed to achieve the strategic results desired by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air Force).

However, the plight of the French ground and air forces at this stage meant that the failure of the operation would not impede the defeat of France.

The only military action was the French Army's Saar Offensive which was terminated in controversial circumstances.

After the Polish Campaign, in October 1939, the planners of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High Command) and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) turned their attentions to Western Europe.

General Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the Army, presented the first plan for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow") on 19 October 1939.

A diversion operation in Belgium and the Netherlands would precede this thrust, to lure the Allied Armies, including the British Expeditionary Force, into a trap.

[8][9] Launched on 10 May 1940, the revised version of Unternehmen Gelb (Operation Yellow), also known as the Manstein Plan, succeeded.

The Luftwaffe had played an integral part in disrupting Allied operations in this early phase.

The Luftwaffe's participation was particularly crucial during the Battle of Sedan which enabled the German Army to carry out Operation Yellow.

[10] Hugo Sperrle had long planned attacks upon Paris and on 22 May he ordered Fliegerkorps II (Air Corps II) and Fliegerkorps V (Air Corps V) with Kampfgeschwader 77 (Bomber Wing 77) and Generaloberst (General Colonel) Ulrich Grauert's I Fliegerdivision, III./Kampfgeschwader 28 (Bomber Wing 28) to bomb Paris.

Determined to continue with his plans, Sperrle ordered Otto Hoffmann von Waldau and Helmuth von Hoffman, Gruppenkommandeur (Group Commander) of III./KG 28,[11] to plan an operation named Paula the following day, on 23 May 1940.

As well as eliminating French airfields and aircraft factories around Paris,[13] in von Waldau's words, the bombing was to "achieve a desirable influence on the morale of the capital".

[12] The operation was compromised by poor staff work and excessive confidence in the "invulnerable" Enigma cipher machine.

British intelligence, which had been able to decrypt the German codes via Ultra, forewarned the French.

[2] Compounding the problem for Germany, the units involved received incomplete orders for the assault.

The French had intercepted similar messages, and in response they doubled their aircraft strength to 120 fighters.

[2] Groupe de Chasse I/145 (Polish) armed with Caudron C.714 fighters were based at Dreux.

[2] On 3 June, the French units were warned an hour before the German bombers took off, but owing to equally poor staff work, few French squadrons heard the scramble signal when it was radioed from the Eiffel Tower and some were caught on the ground.

[17] The Germans would copy this tactic when intercepting United States Army Air Force (USAAF) heavy bombers during the Defence of the Reich campaign.

[2] Along with French AAA defences, the fighters shot down ten German aircraft, including four bombers.

One of these machines was piloted by Jagdfliegerführer 3 (Fighter Flying Leader 3) Oberst Gerd von Massow.

[2] Most of the German bombers had passed over and had an altitude advantage over French fighters trying to gain height to intercept.

It suggested a long list of wrecked French factories and destroyed aircraft on the ground and in the air.

The French forces holding the Somme line were mostly reserve divisions of poorer quality and unsupported by heavy artillery, tanks or motorised infantry.

It was slow and poor, and as a result only 599 aircraft (340 fighters and 170 bombers) were serviceable; a rate of just 29 percent.

[15] After the opening of the offensive, the Luftwaffe "ran riot" over French air space.