In brutal fighting lasting about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, something that the Sri Lankan Army had tried but failed to do.

Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE at the cost of 214 soldiers and officers.

In the late 1980s India, feeling considerable pressure from its Tamil citizens, began to intervene on both a diplomatic and military basis.

Negotiations led to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, under which the Sri Lankan government agreed to give the nation's provinces more power and autonomy and withdraw its troops to their barracks.

The IPKF soon found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the Tigers, which culminated in the separatists being cornered on the Jaffna Peninsula, at the northern end of the island.

[5][6] The first battle signalling the real beginning of Operation Pawan was the heliborne assault on the Jaffna University headquarters of the LTTE by a detachment of Indian Para (Special Forces) and Sikh Light Infantry soldiers on the night of 12 October.

This was planned as a quick commando raid to capture the top LTTE leadership and local commanders who, according to Indian intelligence, were supposed to be in the building at the time and was thus expected to cut short the battle for Jaffna.

The heli-dropped troops came under intense fire from LTTE positions, forcing the Mil Mi-8 helicopters to abandon the insertion midway through the operation.

[5] After the Sikh Light Infantry platoon's signaller was shot by LTTE snipers early on in the battle, the unit lost contact with the Indian High Command at Palay Air Base.

Fighting in built-up and an as-yet un-evacuated Jaffna, the Indian High Command insisted that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defences.

At this time the Indian Air Force undertook a massive airlift to reinforce the 91st with three brigades and heavy equipment, including T-72 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles.

Equipped with powerful telescopic infrared sights, they were able to selectively take out officers and radiomen, inflicting a heavy toll and bringing the advance to a grinding halt.

The IPKF adapted quickly, with its officers taking off the pips of their ranks, wearing slouch hats and carrying oversize back packs.

[10] It was also toward the end of the Jaffna campaign that the IPKF started the use of Mi-25s for close air support[11] when they flew against LTTE positions in Chavakachcheri town on 23 October 1987.

[12] In addition to the LTTE's defensive operations alluded to above, the IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that the Tigers, using classic guerrilla tactics, blended in with the local population.

In the Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines.

In turn, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of separatist weaponry.

Its most obvious manifestation was the Heliborne assault on LTTE HQ in the Jaffna University campus in the opening stages of Operation Pawan.

The site was chosen without any consultation with the R&AW and the dropping paratroopers became easy targets for the LTTE, and a number of Indian soldiers were killed.