Eighth Army possession of Chip’yong-ni, furthermore, would pose a threat of envelopment to enemy forces opposing US I and IX Corps below the Han River.

This force, apparently part of the KPA V Corps, could be preparing to advance southwest on Route 24 through Chip’yongni, then down the Han valley toward Yoju and Ch’ungju.

This advance would base US units far enough forward to support a thrust at Hongcheon, which Almond planned ROK forces would make.

He proposed a flanking operation against Hongcheon by the ROK 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions accompanied by artillery and armor drawn from the US units on the line of departure.

On the right, the ROK 5th Division was to advance north through the mountains east of Route 29 through part of the area occupied by the KPA II Corps, then swing west against Hongch’on.

At the Corps' west flank, the 23rd Infantry Regiment moved north of the Twin Tunnels and occupied Chip’yong-ni, surprisingly against no more than token opposition.

At Corps' center, the 38th Infantry Regiment, now commanded by Colonel John G. Coughlin, occupied Hoengsong, and the 187th RCT the ground immediately southeast.

Behind the line traced by these clumps of Americans, the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were in final assemblies for the Hongcheon attack, one on either side of Route 29.

Ridgway that day ordered a westward shift of the X Corps-ROK III Corps boundary to give the ROK more of the territory north of Pyongchang.

In X Corps' zone, the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions advanced in multiple columns astride the best roads, tracks, or trails permitting passage through the convoluted ground.

Resistance did stiffen after an easy opening day, but the defending forces stayed to the tops of hills and allowed the ROK to bring down heavy artillery concentrations and to maneuver around them.

The ROK assault forces, in Almond's estimation, had gained confidence over the three days, substantially from the presence and support of the US artillery and tanks.

As of 8 February the success of the advance thus appeared largely to depend on overcoming terrain limitations on infantry maneuver, tank movement, and artillery forward displacement.

[1]: 259 Against the combination of enemy hilltop defenses and difficult terrain, the two ROK divisions by 8 February had moved 3–6 miles (4.8–9.7 km) northwest, north, and northeast of Hoengsong.

[1]: 259–61 While Almond was arranging to assist the ROK 8th Division's northwestward swing, a greater problem arose east of Route 29.

Along with this move, he ordered the US 7th Division to send a battalion northwest out of the area above Pyongchang toward a ground objective 16 miles (26 km) due east of Hoengsong.

This advance, he intended, would drive KPA forces located near the Corps' boundary into the path of the ROK 5th Division's attack.

With naval gunfire support from Task Force 95 in the Sea of Japan and against fainthearted opposition by the 69th Brigade, a unit of the KPA III Corps that disappeared altogether on the 8th, the Capital Division advanced in consistently long and rapid strides.

East of Route 29, the ROK 3rd Division by dark on 11 February advanced through light opposition to positions 5 miles (8.0 km) above Hoengsong.

Below Support Force 21, the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, on Almond's order had moved up from Hoengsong into a blocking position at the junction of Route 29 and the mountain road leading west.

After securing Chip’yong-ni before the opening of the operation, the 23rd Infantry Regiment had established a perimeter around the town, and Colonel Paul L. Freeman Jr. had run patrols east, west, and north.

The patrol encounters with enemy forces were mostly minor, but by 9 February one particularly strong position was discovered on Hill 444 some 4 miles (6.4 km) east of Chip’yong-ni.

To move forward while IX Corps was still held up could isolate and overextend Almond's leftmost units in the area where the PVA 39th, 40th, 42nd and 66th Armies were obviously massing.