British/Rhodesian-Nyasaland victory British Empire King's African Rifles Rhodesia and Nyasaland Operation Sunrise was the name given to a police and military action conducted by the authorities in the Central African protectorate of Nyasaland (now known as Malawi) which started on 3 March 1959, initially to detain and intern 350 individuals who were considered a potential threat to law and order in anticipation of the declaration of a State of Emergency.

[5] The protectorate was relatively quiet until, in early 1957, the Nyasaland African Congress revived under a number of young activists, including Henry Chipembere, Kanyama Chiume and the brothers Dunduzu Chisiza and Yatuta Chisiza, who organised Congress as a mass political party and created support for Hastings Banda, a long-term expatriate who had campaigned against Federation, to return to Nyasaland as party leader.

At the end of 1958, Banda and other NAC leaders attended an All-African People's Conference in Accra, in recently-independent Ghana, and they returned to Nyasaland determined to press for constitutional change.

[11] The disturbances particularly affected four heavily populated districts in the south of the protectorate, including the two largest towns and, by mid-February, Armitage considered that the situation was serious enough to prepare for a State of Emergency throughout Nyasaland.

[12] The authorities' concerns were bolstered by reports from several police informers, only one of which was actually present at the clandestine Congress meeting on the night of 24–25 January to discuss the possible action to be taken if Banda were arrested.

[13] The Nyasaland government took no immediate action against Banda, and continued to negotiate with him, and the governor also made no specific reference to the "murder plot" until after his declaration of a State of Emergency.

In a broadcast at 7am on 3 March the governor, Sir Robert Armitage, explained his decision as follows:[21] " I have taken this step because of the action of the leaders of the Nyasaland African Congress.

There were about 60 men sleeping in the surrounding yard – it had been anticipated for some time that Banda might be arrested – who immediately fled, leaving behind an armory of two bows and arrows, four catapults (slingshots, in American parlance), one spear, twelve batons and knobkerries, three axes and some iron bars.

Before these arrived, the district commissioner felt the situation was beyond the control of the few soldiers available, and he ordered then to open fire when the crowd refused to disperse after he had declared a riot.

However, the 225 detainees released in March 1959 and 275 in April included many detained after the first days of Operation Sunrise, an indication of how far Armitage's aim of returning to normal quickly had not been realised.

The district commissioner in 1959, John Brock, believed that, by the standards of the time, he enjoyed good relations with the local people, which he was unwilling to jeopardise by bringing in troops earlier than he thought necessary.

[31] However, he had received secret instructions that Operation Sunrise on 3 March would involve the arrest of detainees from his district at dawn and their lodgement in the town prison until a motor vessel, M.V.

[32][33] The District Commissioner subsequently told the Devlin Commission that he had been advised of the "murder plot" and, although Brock thought it was only a wild idea,[34] he took action to protect the local European residents in Nkhata Bay.

[35] The small local police force had already been reinforced by a police Inspector and 14 constables, and by 11 soldiers of the Kings African Rifles (KAR) but, anticipating trouble when the Operation Sunrise arrests were made, the Major in charge of the army base at Mzimba had been ordered to leave there at 1am with two platoons of white soldiers of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment (RRR), to arrive at Nkhata Bay around 9am.

[38] A crowd began to gather at the prison, and a local Congress leader who had not been arrested, encouraged them to attempt to secure the release of the detainees,[39] unaware that they were already on the Mpasa.

[40] The Royal Rhodesia Regiment sergeant, van Oppen, decided to send six of his men ashore to reinforce the police and KAR at the prison.

The district commissioner attempted to get the crowd to disperse, telling them of the State of Emergency, and when that failed, tried to establish by telephone when the troops from Mzimba would arrive.

Brock, the district commissioner, was left in the very difficult position of controlling a large, angry crowd with few police and troops on hand, with adequate reinforcements a significant distance away.

Sergeant van Oppen was subsequently awarded the British Empire Medal on the recommendation of Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister.

Initially, the District Commissioner refused the RRR sergeant's plea to disperse the crowd by firing limited number of shots at them,[49] as his aim was to avoid bloodshed until the promised reinforcements arrived.

[50] By about 11.30 am, when no further troops had arrived, and the five soldiers had retreated to a point beyond which they could be easily surrounded, he read the Riot Act[51] and, when the crowd did not disperse, handed over his powers to the military.

[59] The initial reaction of many Congress supporters to Operation Sunrise was rioting, damage to government and European property and strikes, and there were five more deaths in Machinga District up to 19 March when soldiers of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment or Kings African Rifles were ordered to open fire on rioters.

It rejected claim of rape and torture made against Federation troops in the Misuku Hills, but it upheld other complaints, including the burning of houses, the imposition of arbitrary fines and beatings, which it considered illegal.

His plan for the next stage envisaged encouraging moderate, non-Congress, African leaders to come forward, issuing pro-government, anti-Congress propaganda and making what he hoped would be firm but friendly displays of police and military force.

[73] By December 1959, the new colonial secretary, Iain Macleod, insisted that the vast majority of detainees should be released quickly, including Banda but not Chipembere, Chiume or the Chisiza brothers and others labelled as extremists.

[75] In January 1960, Armitage also asked for extra troops to be sent from Southern Rhodesia when Banda was due to be released, reinforcements that Macleod declined to authorise.