The German cruiser Admiral Scheer supported by five U-boats and reconnaissance aircraft sailed on 16 August for the Kara Sea where it encountered pack ice.

In 1942, the Seekriegsleitung (SKL) of Oberkommando der Marine, the high command of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) looked for fairly safe operational possibilities for its heavy units.

[3] On 5 May 1942, the Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence) received information from a prisoner of war that the settlement of Amderma, on the Kara Sea, south of Novaya Zemlya, had been expanded into a big port and that it had a railway link to Vorkuta, thence to the hinterland of the Soviet Union.

[5] Admiral Scheer was a Deutschland-class cruiser of welded construction, with diesel engines capable of 56,000 hp (42,000 kW), a range of 21,500 nmi (39,800 km; 24,700 mi) and a maximum speed of 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph).

Two Arado Ar 196 floatplanes were carried for reconnaissance but one was left behind during the Kara Sea sortie; Admiral Scheer had a crew of 1,150 men.

SKL estimated that the convoy would enter the Kara Sea via the Vilkitsky Strait, south of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago, on 15 or 16 August.

There was a wireless station on the island, a geophysical observatory, an airstrip and the regional headquarters of Glavsevmorput the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route.

The defensive potential of Kara Sea settlements was exiguous; merchant ships and icebreakers carried guns and anti-aircraft armament but the polar stations were undefended.

[9][10] For concealment, Admiral Scheer would have to enter the Kara Sea by a northabout route past Cape Zhelaniya and on 11 August, U-601 departed from Kirkenes for the waters north of Novaya Zemlya, to check the ice limit.

The weather conditions were excellent for concealment, with storms and poor visibility but Admiral Scheer was nearly spotted by a Soviet merchant ship on 18 August.

[13] Admiral Scheer sailed eastwards for the Vilkitsky Strait through pack ice and two sorties were flown by the Arado to find the clearest route.

The ice increased and at 9:00 p.m. about 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) north of Uyedineniya Island, Meendsen-Bohlken turned the ship around, apprehensive of damage to the propellers.

[15] From 20 to 25 August, the Kara Sea was searched north and east towards the Vilkitsky Strait and as far west as Uyedineniya Island, to find the convoys discovered by the Arado or uncovered by the B-Dienst party.

[14] The search was thwarted by thick fog and Admiral Scheer lost track of the convoys, then had to sink the Arado after a landing accident.

While searching to the north of Russky Island in the Nordenskiöld Archipelago, Admiral Scheer was enveloped by fog so thick that Meendsen-Bohlken was forced to anchor amidst drifting ice, which began to pack, potentially trapping the ship.

[15] On 25 July, two masts were spotted at 19 nmi (35 km; 22 mi) and Meendsen-Bohlken approached the ship to seize its codes and cyphers to eavesdrop on Russian wireless messages on ice conditions around the Vilkitsky Strait.

North-westerly winds continued to pack the ice into the mouth of the Vilkitsky Strait and after the loss of the Arado, an attack on the convoy near there had to be abandoned.

[17] The volume of wireless transmissions from Dikson to ships and ports intercepted by the B-Dienst party had shown that it was an important base for the western end of Northern Sea Route.

[18] To interfere with these convoys and to capture ice data, which could help gain the objectives of Wunderland, Meendsen-Bohlken decided to attack the port and headed south on 26 August.

[19] The Germans did not know that when the war began, Ivan Papanin, the head of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) had asked for the defences of Dikson to be reinforced.

[21] On 26 August the officers at Dikson met on board SKR-19/Semyon Dezhnev (Senior Lieutenant A. S. Gidulyanov) and decided to form two militia units commanded by Sidorin and Statov, the heads of the polar station.

[22] The guns were being removed and loaded onto for transfer to Beluga Bay on the south island of Novaya Zemlya, which was under frequent German air attack.

[23] The commander of the 569th heavy battery, Lieutenant Kornyakov ordered the unloading of 152 mm ammunition and picked volunteers for the guns from the dock workers.

[20] At 1:05 a.m. on 27 August, lookouts near the former 226th battery emplacement in the north-west of the port spotted Admiral Scheer to the south along the west shore of Dikson Island.

About thirty minutes later Admiral Scheer passed a navigation station at Skuratov near the south harbour, 4.5 mi (7.2 km) from the port.

[25] Admiral Scheer changed aim and quickly hit Revolyutsioner three times, despite the smoke-screen, setting it on fire, cutting the steam pipe and jamming the winch for raising the anchor, keeping the ship stationary.

Kara was fairly well protected by the shore and the smoke but then the 152 mm guns began to fire, sending up columns of water next to Admiral Scheer.

[28] Although Admiral Scheer had been only superficially damaged, if at all, the Russians had only to suspend convoys for a short time and the icing of the Kara Sea would force the raider to withdraw or risk being trapped.

Meendsen-Bohlken broke wireless silence to request permission for a delay, to make a sweep south of the Franz Joseph Archipelago to Svalbard but this was refused and Admiral Scheer began its return voyage.

The Soviet navy had failed to intercept Admiral Scheer because Glavsevmorput, which administered shipping in the Kara Sea, did not inform the Northern Fleet HQ for 36 hours.