Opposing forces in the Polish September Campaign

The main opposing forces in the Polish September Campaign, which marked the beginning of the Second World War in Europe, consisted of Germany (with support from Slovakia) on one side, and Poland on the other.

The Polish Army had about a million soldiers, but fewer than half had been mobilised by 1 September due to political pressure from France and Britain.

The Polish-Soviet War showed Poland the benefits of mobility in military conflicts but Polish officials were unwilling (and unable) to invest heavily to make that a reality.

Germany was only moderately prepared for the invasion of Poland; stocks of ammunition and replacement vehicles, for example, were low, and historians regard Hitler's move as a military gamble as well as a political one.

The German economy had for years geared toward production of military equipment and supplies, and was capable of creating an army that could successfully invade its neighbours only if the campaign was not a long one.

As early as 1940, British production "though still lackadaisical, outstripped that of Germany in aircraft, tanks and heavy guns, in everything in fact except equipment for a large army."

Walter Warlimont, who headed the Department of Home Defence for the Wehrmacht, wrote postwar: In the fact of the successful Polish campaign, Hitler (still) refused to order mobilisation in the full sense of the word; later on, partial mobilisation was ordered, but the economy was specifically exempted...None of the carefully thought-out measures designed to protect the armament industry by keeping its skilled workers on the job was put into effect.

(Quoted in Brute Force (Ellis, Viking Penguin, 1990)) The German military was collectively known as the Wehrmacht, and all three components had separate but related roles to play in the campaign.

Mechanization was the key to this German tactic first revealed in the September Campaign and nicknamed blitzkrieg (lightning war) by contemporary journalists, who found the name fitting because of the unprecedented speed and mobility that were its underlying characteristics.

Despite the term blitzkrieg being coined by the Allies during the Polish September Campaign of 1939, historians (such as Matthew Cooper) generally hold that German operations in Poland were more traditional than revolutionary.

Cooper, for one, writes (in The German Army (1976)) that Heer strategy was more inline with Vernichtungsgedanken, or a focus on envelopment to create pockets in broad-front annihilation.

That noted, in 1939 Germany did have an advantage over the tiny Polish fleet, and the Western Allies were unwilling and unprepared to challenge the Kriegsmarine on the small, land-locked Baltic Sea.

Polish military industry development and fortifications were scheduled to be completed in that year, and newer tanks and aircraft were just entering production or would shortly.

The Polish defense budget for 1938–39 was 800 million zlotys, of which: To raise funds for industrial development, Poland was selling much of the modern equipment it produced; for example, anti-tank guns were sold to Britain and planes were exported to Greece.

Less than half of the Polish armed forces had been mobilized by 1 September, and only one-quarter (250,000) were fully equipped and in assigned positions when hostilities commenced.

Thus many soldiers, mobilised after 1 September, failed to reach the designated staging areas and, together with normal civilians, sustained significant casualties when public transport (trains and roads filled with refugees) became targets of the German Air Force.

Poland stood in the middle: acknowledging the benefits of mobility but unwilling (and unable) to invest heavily in the expensive and unproven new inventions, it turned to cavalry, which the Polish Army considered its elite corps.

However, while Polish cavalry matched German panzers in speed and anti-infantry effectiveness, in the end it simply could not stand its ground against tanks.

The slightly better PZL P.24 was used solely for export, and PZL.50s and several other projects, which were supposed to have better parameters than contemporary German fighters, were still during prototype's tests.

Smaller than most contemporary medium bombers, it was still able to carry a heavier bomb load than comparable aircraft, including the famous Vickers Wellington.

During the September Campaign, despite their good performance, they were too few in number to change the outcome and, often lacking fighter cover, sustained heavy losses, especially when used to attack armoured columns.

Submarine forces were participating in Operation Worek, with the goal of engaging and damaging German shipping in the Baltic Sea, but with much less success.

The Polish government had relocated to the south-eastern town of Kuty on 17 September 1939 and held a cabinet meeting at 4pm, in full knowledge that Soviet forces were advancing rapidly towards them.

The Polish government refused to surrender or negotiate a peace, and instead ordered all units to evacuate Poland with the aim of eventually reorganising in France.