Ordinary language philosophy

"[2] This approach typically involves eschewing philosophical "theories" in favor of close attention to the details of the use of everyday "ordinary" language.

Its earliest forms are associated with the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and a number of mid-20th century philosophers who can be split into two main groups, neither of which could be described as an organized "school".

[3] In its earlier stages, contemporaries of Wittgenstein at Cambridge University such as Norman Malcolm, Alice Ambrose, Friedrich Waismann, Oets Kolk Bouwsma and Morris Lazerowitz started to develop ideas recognisable as ordinary language philosophy.

These ideas were further elaborated from 1945 onwards through the work of some Oxford University philosophers led initially by Gilbert Ryle, then followed by J. L. Austin and Paul Grice.

Philosophers a generation after Austin who made use of the method of ordinary language philosophy include Antony Flew, Stanley Cavell, John Searle and Oswald Hanfling.

Today, Alice Crary, Nancy Bauer, Sandra Laugier, as well as literary theorists Toril Moi, Rita Felski, and Shoshana Felman have adopted the teachings of Cavell in particular, generating a resurgence of interest in ordinary language philosophy.

Gottlob Frege, the Vienna Circle (especially Rudolf Carnap), the young Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine all attempted to improve upon it, in particular using the resources of modern logic.

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein more or less agreed with Russell that language ought to be reformulated so as to be unambiguous, so as to accurately represent the world, so that we can better deal with philosophical questions.

Ordinary language analysis largely flourished and developed at Oxford University in the 1940s, under Austin and Ryle, and was quite widespread for a time before declining rapidly in popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Despite this decline, Stanley Cavell and John Searle (both students of Austin) published seminal texts which draw significantly from the ordinary language tradition in 1969.

This caused a relatively recent resurgence of interest in this methodology, with some updates particularly due to the literature and teachings of Cavell, has also become a mainstay of what might be called postanalytic philosophy.

It was obvious to me the moment I came across it, although initially, if your entire environment, and all the bright people in it, hold something to be true, you assume you must be wrong, not understanding it properly, and they must be right.