Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy
Boasting the fourth largest Merchant Marine in the world, and deriving the majority of its foreign capital through maritime trading should have been enough to persuade the Canadian government of the strategic importance of the seas.
[1] For Britain's Royal Navy, the Canadian merchant fleet represented a ready supply of vessels that could have been converted to auxiliary warships, with some help to procure the necessary armament should a crisis arise.
[4] Charybdis was the product of a shift in domestic policy stemming from a host of grievances the young Dominion of Canada had towards the British Empire's handling of its foreign affairs.
The United States still represented Canada's surest enemy in the late 19th century, but Britain's attitude became more frequently one of laissez-faire towards that fast emerging economic and military giant.
One example was the imperial government's unwillingness to apprehend and prosecute American poachers contravening the fisheries articles of the Anglo-American Treaty of Washington of 1871,[5] and risk a quarrel with the US on behalf of the Dominion.
The MP for Huron South Malcolm Colin Cameron made a motion in the House of Commons that she must be returned to the Royal Navy, an unfortunate solution that soon ensued.
That this first attempt at building a Canadian Navy ended in a fiasco did not terribly bother the British one; the official position was that the Imperial Fleet should be as indivisible as the seas themselves.
This was never debated since Canada and the other British colonies afforded Britain with secure supplies of natural resources and ready markets for finished products.
In raw materials the dependence was even more marked: seven-eighths of these came from abroad by 1913.At the turn of the twentieth century, the rise of the Imperial German Navy under Kaiser Wilhelm II threatened to challenge Britain for supremacy of all maritime trade routes.
Britain, feeling pressure to modernize and expand its already considerable fleet, asked that the former colonies assume a larger responsibility for the defence of the empire.
[9] The preferred choice of the Imperial government for the protection of the empire was the maintenance of a common military system, sustained by direct financial contributions from the former colonies.
At the Imperial Conference of 1902, Laurier refused direct contributions to the maintenance of the British fleet, and instead pushed for the development of a local navy under the Department of Marine and Fisheries.
[11] When the British government announced in 1904 its intentions to abandon the Halifax and Esquimalt Dockyards by 1906, Laurier saw another compelling reason for the formation of Canada's naval service.
Brodeur had the arduous task of re-organizing his department after a report by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service stated that its administration was characterized by "constant blundering and confusion", "with no visible sign of an intelligence purpose unless it be that of spending as much money as possible".
After instilling these changes, Laurier believed he would get the unanimous support of parliament for his plans to militarise the Fisheries Protection Service into a navy proper.
The ensuing resolution was presented to the House of Commons by the one-time minister of Marine and Fisheries conservative MP Sir George Foster from New Brunswick and stated: "That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and natural environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone benefits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to suitable protection of her exposed coastline and great seaports.
The amended proposal was that of a small navy, given that "The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service".
The Naval Service Act, proposed to the House of Commons on 10 January 1910, called for a fleet of eleven warships: one Boadicea, four Bristol-class cruisers and five torpedo-boat destroyers.
[22] The opposition Conservative coalition, the imperialists under Sir Robert Borden and the Nationalistes led by Henri Bourassa, vehemently opposed Laurier's plans for a Canadian Navy, but for totally different reasons.
Bourassa founded the daily newspaper Le Devoir,[9] with the express purpose of defeating the Naval Service Act through insinuations and allegations that conscription would soon follow.
[25] This contentious issue of jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit was resolved at the Imperial Conference of 1911, with the formation of the Canadian Atlantic and Pacific Stations, covering the waters North of 30°, and ranging from 40° to 160° West.
The naval issue had ranked far behind that of trade reciprocity with the US in most of Canada during the election campaign, but Henri Bourassa made sure that it took centre stage in Quebec.
[33] At the urging of the Admiralty's First Sea Lord Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister Borden agreed to finance the construction of three dreadnoughts for $35 million.
