The Indian government, on the other hand, concentrated its military efforts on stopping Ladakh from being taken by Pakistani troops and did not establish itself in Aksai Chin.
At this time, the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).
[15] On 1 July 1954 Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers, where they were previously indicated as undemarcated.
[17] Beginning in 1956, the CIA used Indian territory to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops, with a base in Kalimpong, India.
[23] Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions (befriending China on such issues as war in Korea, the PRC's U.N. admission, the peace treaty with Japan and transfer of Taiwan to the PRC, Indochina, and decolonization and the Afro-Asian movement) had given Nehru a confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.
[26] Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong was humiliated by the reception the Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959.
[30] This publication was evident of China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet, which became an underlying reason for triggering the Sino-Indian War.
India had become the imperialist enemy, with Nehru and his "big bourgeoisie" striving to "prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its territory of Tibet" to form of a buffer zone.
According to the Indian official history, India wished to express goodwill to China and stop the claims of it having a hostile design in Tibet.
Recognizing that it was not ready for war, the Indian Army assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas.
The Soviet Union's siding with Nehru, as well as the United States' influence in the region, gave China the belief that it was surrounded by enemy forces.
[38] A few days after Kongka Pass, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed that each side withdraw 20 kilometres from a "Line of Actual Control".
Zhou consistently refused to accept the legitimacy of India's territorial claims; he proposed that any negotiations had to take into account the facts on the ground.
"[14][page needed] He remained firm that there would be no boundary negotiations until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin and areas south of the British McMahon Line.
In light of these comments, the international community rallied behind Nehru in claiming that China was at fault in failing to conduct proper negotiations.
[47] Kaul reorganized the general staff and removed the officers who had resisted the idea of patrolling in disputed areas, although Nehru still refused to increase military spending or otherwise prepare for war.
In response the Indians launched a policy of creating outposts behind the Chinese troops so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China.
[35] British author Neville Maxwell traces this confidence to Mullik, who was in regular contact with the CIA station chief in New Delhi.
According to Chinese sources, in June 1962, a minor skirmish broke out between the two sides, and dozens of members of the People's Liberation Army killed and wounded.
[59] Chinese airfields in Tibet and Yunnan were addressed as a threat to Indian cities, as the PLAAF could conduct heavy bombings through their use of Soviet aeroplanes.
According to China Quarterly, the Government of India released press reports to the public indicating that Indian had gained 2,000 mi2 of territory from the Chinese.
[63] In August, 1962, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line, particularly in the North East Frontier Agency, Tibet and Xinjiang.
This neglect on behalf of India would decide numerous pivotal battles where logistical inadequacy and lack of leadership led to defeat after strong starts.
[35] In June 1962, Indian forces had established an outpost called Dhola Post, in the Namkha Chu valley bordering the southern slopes of Thagla Ridge, overlooking the village of Le in Tibet.
[14][page needed][17] Brigadier John Dalvi would later write of this claim: "The Chinese had raised a dispute about the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area.
Therefore the Thagla-Dhola area was not strictly territory that 'we should have been convinced was ours' as directed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, and someone is guilty of exceeding the limits prescribed by him.
[65] On 8 September 1962, a 60-strong PLA unit[14][page needed][35] descended from the heights and occupied positions which dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola.
[66] Nehru had gone to London to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and, when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory".
According to the official Indian history, a decision was made on 9 September to evict the Chinese from the southern part of the Thagla Ridge, by force, if necessary.
[69][14][page needed] By the time the Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge area in the Chedong region on 16 September, north of the McMahon Line,[35] Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namkha Chu valley.