At the national level, American leaders had been satisfied to have the island remain in weak Spanish hands so long as it did not pass to a stronger power such as Britain or France.
At the suggestion of Secretary of State William L. Marcy, American ministers in Europe—Pierre Soulé for Spain, James Buchanan for Britain, and John Y. Mason for France—met to discuss strategy related to an acquisition of Cuba.
The document was sent to Washington in October 1854, outlining why a purchase of Cuba would be beneficial to each of the nations and declaring that the U.S. would be "justified in wresting" the island from Spanish hands if Spain refused to sell.
[10] Radical expansionists and the Young America movement were quickly gaining traction by 1848, and a debate about whether to annex the Yucatán portion of Mexico that year included significant discussion of Cuba.
Even John C. Calhoun, described as a reluctant expansionist who strongly disagreed with intervention on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, concurred that "it is indispensable to the safety of the United States that this island should not be in certain hands",[8] likely referring to Britain.
[11] In light of a Cuban uprising, President James K. Polk refused solicitations from filibuster backer John L. O'Sullivan and stated his belief that any acquisition of the island must be an "amicable purchase".
[12] Under orders from Polk, Secretary of State James Buchanan prepared an offer of $100 million, but "sooner than see [Cuba] transferred to any power, [Spanish officials] would prefer seeing it sunk into the ocean".
[13] The Whig administrations of presidents Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore did not pursue the matter and took a harsher stand against filibusters such as Venezuelan Narciso López, with federal troops intercepting several expeditions bound for Cuba.
To this end, he appointed expansionists to diplomatic posts throughout Europe, notably sending Pierre Soulé, an outspoken proponent of Cuban annexation, as United States Minister to Spain.
The so-called Black Warrior Affair was viewed by Congress as a violation of American rights; a hollow ultimatum issued by Soulé to the Spanish to return the ship served only to strain relations, and he was barred from discussing Cuba's acquisition for nearly a year.
[19] Southern-backed filibusters, including Narciso López, had failed repeatedly since 1849 to 1851 to overthrow the colonial government despite considerable support among the Cuban people for independence,[b] and a series of reforms on the island made Southerners apprehensive that slavery would be abolished.
But Robert May writes, "the instructions for the conference had been so vague, and so many of Marcy's letters to Soulé since the Black Warrior incident had been bellicose, that the ministers misread the administration's intent.
"[23] After a minor disagreement about their meeting site, the three American diplomats met in Ostend, Belgium from October 9–11, 1854, then adjourned to Aachen, Prussia, for a week to prepare a report of the proceedings.
[24] The resulting dispatch, which would come to be known as the Ostend Manifesto, declared that "Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of states of which the Union is the Providential Nursery".
[26] The Manifesto urged against inaction on the Cuban question, warning, We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo (Haiti), with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.
[27]Racial fears raised tension and anxiety in the U.S. over a potential black uprising on the island that could "spread like wildfire" to the southern U.S.[28] The Manifesto stated that the U.S. would be "justified in wresting" Cuba from Spain if the colonial power refused to sell it.
His belief in Manifest Destiny led him to prophesy "absorption of the entire continent and its island appendages" by the U.S.[30] Mason's Virginian roots predisposed him to the sentiments expressed in the document, but he later regretted his actions.
"[36] During the period of Bleeding Kansas, as anti- and pro-slavery supporters fought for control of the state, the Ostend Manifesto served as a rallying cry for the opponents of the Slave Power.