The proliferation of surface-to-air missiles and armored forces makes airborne assaults highly risky against a conventional army, and entry into enemy territory, when necessary, is more easily achieved through amphibious invasions or helicopter deployments.
Globally, light infantry forces, which are easily air-transportable, remain valuable for rapid crisis response, but they do not necessarily need to be paratroopers.
However, these programs were focused on aviators rather than large troop jumps, like those conducted by German paratroopers (Fallschirmjäger) and their American counterparts, both of which attracted interest in Brazil.
[12][13] In this context, in 1944, captain Roberto Pêssoa, who had prior exposure to German airborne forces, was selected for a parachuting course at Fort Benning, USA.
Pêssoa aspired to lead the school, but the position was assumed by colonel Nestor Penha Brasil, creating a personal rivalry.
However, it "never had more than one incomplete airborne infantry regiment, an artillery group, an engineering company, and a communications platoon",[17] totaling 2,086 soldiers in 1960, which did not amount to the size of a brigade.
[27] In 2010, there was a plan to transfer the brigade to the central part of the country, to locations such as Anápolis, Palmas, or the Triângulo Mineiro, where it would be closer to areas like the Amazon and free from interference caused by Rio de Janeiro's busy air traffic.
Their ability to rapidly access any point within Brazil's territory was also critical during deployments to counter the Aragarças and Jacareacanga revolts in 1956 and 1959, respectively, though they did not engage in combat.
Ernesto Geisel, head of the Military Cabinet of the Presidency, suggested deploying paratroopers in Curitiba, within the Third Army's territory, but Denys declined.
[33] Shortly thereafter, while the president was requesting a state of emergency, an assassination attempt allegedly ordered by the Minister of War against Carlos Lacerda, the opposition governor of Guanabara, was reported.
A swiftly concluded investigation accepted the official version that no assassination attempt had occurred, but the commander, general Alfredo Pinheiro Soares Filho, a close ally of the president, was transferred.
[41] Instability among the paratroopers peaked in 1969,[39] when lieutenant colonel Dickson Melges Grael, commander of the 1st Airborne Artillery Group, rebelled against the 1969 military junta.
[43] The nativists, who supported the presidential candidacy of general Afonso Augusto de Albuquerque Lima, had limited influence within the army.
Colonel Hílton Valle, head of security, feared that general Siseno Sarmento, commander of the I Army, might send paratroopers to transfer the president to a hospital, causing his definitive replacement and the end of the 1969 military junta.
[49] In the first half of the 1970s, the brigade specialized in "revolutionary warfare", participating in the repression of rural and urban armed struggle (in Rio de Janeiro).
The successful Operation Marajoara, in its final phase, involved 750 men from the Paratrooper Brigade and the Jungle Warfare Instruction Center.
[51] After 1975, with the depletion of adversaries and the onset of political liberalization, the focus of training shifted back to airborne operations, although specialized units continued their counterinsurgency studies.
Hugo de Abreu, now Chief of the Military Cabinet, positioned an emissary at the Vila Militar to ensure the brigade could be deployed anywhere in the country if necessary.
[58] From 1992 to 2020, paratroopers participated in 40 out of 138 law and order guarantee operations carried out by the Armed Forces, with securing electoral processes being the most frequent category.
The brigade also contributed personnel to the Organization of American States (OAS) intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and to various United Nations peacekeeping contingents.
Given their circumstances ("few have reached high school"), the salaries are attractive (20% above the standard military pay), and job prospects in civilian life, particularly in private security, are better.
[28][61] Both the selection process and training aim to ensure homogeneity, standardizing the group's profile and behavior even more than is typical for military institutions.
The potential connection of volunteers to drug trafficking is monitored during the selection process, and this concern was one of the reasons behind the proposal to relocate the unit to the Central Plateau.
Compared to the hundreds of paratroopers who leave the service each year, estimates of those involved in trafficking are small (e.g., 15–20 in 2002), although the actual number may be significantly higher.
[66] These traditions reinforce both equality within the brigade and the distinction between its members and other military personnel,[65] the "black feet", who do not wear the brown boots.
[77] Successful airdrop tests were conducted with the EE-3 Jararaca from Engesa,[78] but the squadron only adopted armored vehicles in December 2021, when the VBTP-MR Guarani was delivered.
[80] Initially, there was no anti-aircraft artillery battery, unlike motorized brigades, due to the assumption that an airborne assault would only occur under conditions of air superiority.
[75] The Parachute Folding, Maintenance, and Air Supply Battalion (DOMPSA) and the Paratrooper Pathfinder Company are also unique to the brigade, both with their own specialized courses.
Pathfinders jump ahead of the main force, manage drop zones, assist in reorganizing descending paratroopers, conduct reconnaissance, and gather intelligence.