At its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, Engesa was recognized as one of the "big three" in Brazil's defense industry, alongside Avibras and Embraer, but it could not withstand the sector's crisis in the late 1980s and went bankrupt in 1993.

Starting as a supplier of parts for the oil industry, Engesa moved into modifying trucks, established ties with the military, and in 1972 received technology from the Brazilian Army for two armored vehicles to begin production.

Export contracts were secured through informal negotiation channels, adaptability to customer requirements, and indifference to how buyers used the vehicles—many of whom faced difficulties importing from the developed world.

The company pursued a technological leap with the development of the EE-T1 Osório main battle tank, built primarily with foreign components to compete in the high-end international market.

At the time, the company's leadership blamed external circumstances for the crisis, while analysts pointed to financial and administrative deficiencies that had not been addressed during the golden years of exports.

Trucks and utility vehicles frequently broke down on the harsh roads to their destinations in Brazil's northeast, leading to Engesa's "homemade solution" of a suspension and traction system.

Then, contacts with Brazilian Navy officers who had studied motor mechanics in the army made it possible to adapt the suspension and traction of Marine Corps trucks as well.

[10] When Engesa entered the defense sector, a modernization program was taking place driven by the alliance of the Brazilian Armed Forces with industrialists, state-owned companies and multinationals.

[17] In June 1971, the VBB, now called "Wheeled Reconnaissance Car" (CRR),[9] had its studies, project and industrial designs transferred to Engesa so that it could begin production.

The choice of Engesa and not Bernardini to take over the armored vehicle was due Whitaker's openly nationalist and sympathetic views to Brazil's dictatorship, as well as being a friend of lieutenant colonel Pedro de Mello, the commander of the Working Group of Automobile Engineers.

[19][20] Sales of adaptation kits for trucks declined in the late 1970s, with the latest successes being transport platforms for Scania models and trailers for Mercedes.

[10] The experience gained allowed the development of Engesa's own version of the GMC truck, the EE-25,[18] designed hastily together with the EE-15 to accompany the sale of the Cascavel and Urutu,[21] thus offering "complete packages".

[4] The line of military "utilities" was completed by the EE-50, a 6x6 with a capacity of five tons (ten on a regular basis) from the late 1970s; the EE-34, a pickup truck using technology from Envemo, purchased in 1983; and the EE-12 or Engesa 4, a jeep presented in 1984.

[29] The production of tractors designed years earlier, with financing from Finep and utilities, expanded, from 1983 onwards, the domestic market's share of sales.

[47] Underdeveloped countries were limited not only in budget but also in educational level and time to train technical staff, so that the already described "rusticity" of Brazilian products made them attractive to this category of buyers.

[48] The first contracts were signed with Iraq and Libya, and the Brazilian Army was crucial in covering the bureaucratic work and bringing Whitaker closer to Muammar al-Gaddafi, the Libyan dictator.

[49] At first, contracts were signed with the technology still incomplete, to the point where the first Libyan Cascavels arrived without armor; it was a risk made possible by the support of the Brazilian Army.

[37] In Iraq, the modus operandi was to speed up negotiations through informal channels, despite the risks involved in directly exposing officials to ambassadors, ministers and generals.

The willingness to modify the product to customer requirements was greater than that existing among European suppliers, and parts for weapons of other origins were also sold, such as Soviet T tanks and MiG fighters.

[50] Given the illiteracy of the Iraqi soldiers operating the Cascavel, the projectile cases were given different colors to facilitate identification and the training was recorded and delivered on video.

[53] The United States took a dim view of the sales because they took place without conditions of use — part of what was sold to Libya went to rebels in Western Sahara and Chad[c] — and created a risk of disseminating technology to hostile countries in the Third World or even to the Soviet Union.

[57] Human resources were aggressively captured: the company looked for the most qualified professionals on the market and offered salaries up to two or three times higher than what they received.

[74] The performance of the divisions was hampered by managerial inexperience and disregard for cultural and production incompatibilities between them, which did not necessarily increase Engesa's competitive advantage.

The company blamed the government: it had not paid off its own debts and suspended IPI credits in November 1979, preferring to promote exports by manipulating the exchange rate.

[92] The latter was achieved when in December 1981 Whitaker's allies interceded with BNDE's president: businessman Francisco Catão[e] and Morgan banker Keith McDermott.

Engesa also allegedly had corrupt relations with Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet through his daughter's UBS account, Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India from 1984 to 1989, a Bolivian president and Delfim Neto.

[105] The situation required a downsizing, but senior management took a long time to do so, waiting for the sale of Osório to be completed or for new orders from the government,[106] in which they placed their trust; the high investments were based on the assumption that redemocratization in Brazil would not happen anytime soon and the support of the military would remain firm.

In October 1987, Bolivia's Undersecretary of Defense revealed that Engesa's failure to provide spare parts for 700 trucks led to their destruction within three years.

An Iraqi default of 200 million, Osório's commercial failure, the general industry crisis, inefficiency, high costs, mismanagement and lack of government support decided the company's fate.

In 1993, a consortium of the Brasilinterpart bank and the Overseas Finance Management Corporation group gave up on buying the company after discovering that it had US$600 million in debt.