[2] The other statements were admissible because they either counted as physical evidence for 5th Amendment purposes[3] or fell under the routine booking exception to Miranda v.

Citing Schmerber v. California, Justice Brennan noted the distinction the Court has drawn between “’testimonial’ and ‘real or physical evidence’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.”[3] The privilege does not apply to compelling a suspect to hand over “real or physical evidence”; it only applies to compelling communications that are testimonial.

[12] The Court concluded that the slurring itself was not testimonial, so Muniz’s responses were still admissible even though the officer had not recited Miranda warnings at that point.

The issue here was that a judge or jury “could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he did not know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.”[3] The question the Court focused on was “whether the incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act or from physical evidence.”[13] The Court did an overview of its past cases on testimonial evidence, and discussed the historical purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Quoting Doe v. United States (487 U.S. 201 (1988)), the Court explained that “[a]t its core, the privilege reflects our fierce “’unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.’”[14] The decision in this case “flows from the concept’s core meaning.”[14] The Court noted: [I]t is evident that a suspect is “compelled ... to be a witness against himself” at least whenever he must face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma—either during a criminal trial where a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial interrogation where, as we explained in Miranda, the choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns.

In Part III-C, the Court held that Muniz’s responses to the biographical questions—“name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age”[15]—were admissible because “the questions fall within a ‘routine booking question’ exception which exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.’”[4] Finally, in Part IV, the Court addressed the admissibility of Muniz’s statements during the sobriety tests and regarding the breathalyzer test.