1970), was a controversial appeal arising from the voluntary manslaughter conviction of Huey P. Newton, the reputed co-founder of the Black Panther Party for Self Defense.
This case stands for the proposition that trial courts have an affirmative duty to instruct juries as to a defense of involuntary unconsciousness where there exists evidence that may support that conclusion.
In the early morning hours of October 28, 1967, Officer John Frey of the Oakland Police Department identified and stopped a Black Panther vehicle driven by Huey P. Newton along with an unidentified passenger.
Officer Frey conducted the stop on the basis of outstanding warrants issued to a Laverne Williams for parking violations associated with the vehicle.
"[1] In order to corroborate that testimony, the defense called Dr. Bernard Diamond, who stated that Newton's recollection is consistent with a gunshot wound to the abdominal cavity, which is likely to produce a "profound reflex shock reaction" that can lead to a loss of consciousness.
[1] The Superior Court of Alameda County convicted defendant Huey P. Newton of voluntary manslaughter in the fatal shooting of a California police officer.
Expounding on that reasoning, the Court of Appeal clarified that a state of unconsciousness, under the law, "need not reach the physical dimensions commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, incapability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can exist .
"[1] Thus, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider the possibility that Newton was unconscious at the time of the shooting, thereby lacking the requisite mental state—mens rea—to commit any crime at all.
"[1] Conversely, defense counsel's neglect or mistake does not bar an appeal where the trial court retained an affirmative duty to instruct the jury on its own motion.
Given the facts, only a theory of unconsciousness would afford Newton a complete defense to criminal homicide consistent with his denial of the shootings altogether.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal failed to discern any "deliberate tactical purpose" in defense counsel's withdrawal of its initial request for the relevant jury instructions.
"[3] Accordingly, Newton's defense counsel played a significant role in the voir dire process in hopes of selecting an impartial jury that was capable of putting aside prejudicial pretrial impressions about the defendant.
While the latter provided sufficient grounds to reverse Newton's conviction, the Court of Appeal still addressed—and denied—the charges of improper jury selection in the murder trial.
"[1] However, the Court of Appeal reiterated that constitutional standards for selecting grand and petit jurors must not "systematically exclude, or substantially underrepresent, the members of any identifiable group in the community.
"[1] Here, the Court of Appeal stated that "the county's discretion to use voter registration lists as the source of jurors is subject to the constitutional requirement that juries must reasonably reflect a cross-section of the community.