In late June 1968, COSVN and the commanders of Military Region 5 held a series of conferences to review the results of the May offensive, also in attendance was Lê Duẩn who had pushed for the original plan for the General Offensive–General Uprising.

[2] On 24 July in Hanoi, Lê Duẩn met with senior leaders responsible for military affairs including PAVN chief of staff, General Văn Tiến Dũng to develop the operational plan for the offensive.

Saigon would not be targeted because of the severe losses suffered by VC forces there in the Tet and May offensives and subsequent Allied security operations.

[1]: 642 In the Central Highlands the PAVN 1st Division was to seize the Duc Lap Camp and then move northeast to threaten Buôn Ma Thuột.

On 10 August COMUSMACV General Creighton Abrams reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the “current deployment of [allied] ground forces is satisfactory,” and he was “confident in our ability” to defeat the offensive.

On the evening of 17 August a night ambush patrol from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, operating between Nui Ba Den and Highway 13 3 km east of Tây Ninh, observed a VC unit marching toward the capital.

At dawn Companies A and B, 4/23rd Infantry moved from Firebase Rawlins III (11°17′31″N 106°11′13″E / 11.292°N 106.187°E / 11.292; 106.187) to southeast Tây Ninh, and the ARVN Task Force 2-34 was deployed to the southwest.

[1]: 649 At midday on 18 August Company B 1/5th Infantry engaged a two battalion strong PAVN unit in the Bến Củi Rubber Plantation northeast of Tây Ninh.

[1]: 649–50 At 18:45 on 19 August, the 33rd Regiment ambushed a column of Company B 1/5th Infantry and Troop A 3/4th Cavalry as they moved along Route 239 through the Bến Củi Plantation towards Dầu Tiếng Base Camp.

B-40 and recoilless rifle fire knocked out the two leading vehicles and Company B established a defensive position north of the road while artillery and air strikes were called in.

[1]: 650–1 On the early morning of 20 August, a night ambush platoon from Company A, 2/27th Infantry, 2 km north of Tây Ninh Combat Base spotted a unit of VC.

Company A deployed south down Route 26 from Firebase Rawlins III and the combined force made the VC disengage leaving 28 dead.

[1]: 653–4 On the morning of 22 August on Route 239 in the Bến Củi Plantation, Company B, 1/5th Infantry, reengaged elements of the 33rd Regiment killing 24 PAVN/VC for the loss of four U.S. dead and 16 wounded.

The 2nd Brigade commander sent a task force comprising Companies A, B and D of the 2/27th Infantry, supported by elements of Troop A, 3/4th Cavalry to construct a new firebase named Schofield (11°15′11″N 106°17′06″E / 11.253°N 106.285°E / 11.253; 106.285) on Route 239 halfway between the Bến Củi and Cau Khoi Plantations.

[1]: 654 On the afternoon of 25 August, an 89 vehicle supply convoy manned by troops from the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions escorted by military police in gun-jeeps was moving along Highway 22 towards Tây Ninh Combat Base.

As the convoy passed by the Thanh Duc Rubber Plantation approximately 10 km southeast of Tây Ninh they observed troops in ARVN uniforms in the trees to the east.

[1]: 665 On 11 September the offensive against Tây Ninh was renewed when the 271st Regiment fired 200 mortar rounds at Firebase Buell II before launching an attack that was repulsed by the 3/22nd Infantry.

On the evening of 11 September the ARVN 3rd Airborne Brigade and the 4th Marine Battalion were landed by helicopter in the northeast suburbs of Tây Ninh to clear the area.

[1]: 670 After midnight on 20 September the 1st Battalion, 272nd Regiment, attacked a Regional Forces outpost in Phước Tân hamlet, 20 km west of Tay Ninh City, losing 35 killed in the brief assault.

The next morning the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment was flown into Lộc Ninh and 3 companies were sent in separate columns towards Hill 222 (11°53′17″N 106°37′44″E / 11.888°N 106.629°E / 11.888; 106.629), 6 km north of the town.

At 13:00 as the helicopter carrying 1st Infantry Division commander MG Keith L. Ware flew in to observe the assault on Hill 222 it was hit by anti-aircraft fire 5 km south of Lộc Ninh and crashed killing all eight on board.

On the morning of 14 September, Companies B and C, 1/2nd Infantry, marched north to join the attack at Hill 222, but when the assault resumed later that day they found that the PAVN had abandoned the position overnight.

[1]: 655–6 On the night of 22–23 August PAVN and VC attacked 36 bases, towns and cities across I Corps mainly with rocket and mortar fire.

[1]: 656–7 At 01:00 on 23 August the VC V25 and T89 Battalions tried to capture the Cẩm Lệ Bridge, 2 km south of Da Nang Air Base to allow follow-on units to attack the city.

North of the bridge, a company from the VC 402nd Sapper Battalion tried to seize the Hòa Vang District, but were held back by Regional Force units who were also reinforced by Marines and Rangers.

The 402nd Sappers fell back to the Cẩm Lệ Bridge, where they continued to fight for a further nine hours, but by late afternoon after air and artillery strikes they abandoned the position leaving 184 dead.

[1]: 657 [4]: 381 1st Marine Division commander MG Carl A. Youngdale ordered his units to block the retreat of the PAVN from Da Nang in Operation Sussex Bay.

[4]: 381–2 At midnight on 30 August Company H 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines ambushed a PAVN unit attempting to cross the Song Ky Lam river to Go Noi island killing 29 for no U.S. losses.

[1]: 665–6 The US claimed that the PAVN/VC lost 16,578 soldiers in August and a further 13,163 in September, while U.S. losses over the same period were over 700 dead and an unknown number of ARVN/Allied troops although not all of these were involved in the Phase III offensive.

[1]: 672 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History.