At 13:30 the Rangers walked into an ambush by the VC 70th Battalion which was overrun within 15 minutes, losing a third of their men, the remainder withdrew and established a defensive perimeter 1.2 km northwest and called for air support.

The 1st Regiment was prevented from reinforcing the Rangers by intensive small arms and mortar fire and Marine airstrikes hit the VC positions.

[3]: 74 On 18 August 1972 following an artillery barrage by 130mm guns the PAVN 711th Division attacked and captured Quế Sơn town and Firebase Ross, including 15-20 of the then secret TOW missiles among the abandoned equipment.

[13] On 25 August Brigadier General Phan Hoa Hiep was relieved of command for the loss of Firebase Ross, which was described as the worst South Vietnamese defeat since the height of the Easter Offensive with the division rendered temporarily combat ineffective.

In southern Quảng Ngai, the PAVN 52nd Regiment, 2nd Division, established defenses around the Ba Tơ district town, which it had controlled since late 1972.

Since the PAVN had blocked the only north - south line of communication and had secured a seaport, however small and undeveloped, in the center of the country and the Accords stipulated a ceasefire in place, the ARVN could hardly permit this situation to go unchallenged.

[15]: 23–4 Following their victory at Sa Huỳnh the division was to support Regional and Popular Forces in clearing the lowlands west of Highway 1 of the remnants of VC units.

By October, the division could claim substantial success in this mission, and the emphasis shifted to continuing the pressure on local VC units until they withdrew into the foothills.

Added to these general missions was one very specific requirement, imposed not only by orders from I Corps but compelled by the honor of the division: defend Sa Huỳnh.

According to General Nhut at the time, at least a part of the problem of territorial ineffectiveness in Quang Ngai Province was traceable to the fact that a very high percentage of the RF/PF and Peoples' Self-Defense Force troops had relatives in the VC ranks; family loyalties often took precedence over military orders and duties.

Mortar, rocket and artillery fire fell on the defending 931st RF Company, two PF platoons and about 60 People's Self-Defense Force militia.

This maneuver placed a major PAVN force in position to support attacks against the line of communication to Tiên Phước District and to block overland movement to Hau Duc.

A relief column headed by the 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, was hit by heavy PAVN mortar and rocket fire 9 km from Ky Tra.

While the infantry fought in the hills, the PAVN pounded the division headquarters at Chu Lai and the city of Tam Ky and its airfield with 122-mm.

The 5th Regiment had also suffered moderate losses since 1 June on the Quang Tin battlefield, mostly along the Tam Ky-Tiên Phước road and was only marginally effective.

There the PAVN 52nd Brigade maintained pressure against lines of communication and population centers, defended largely by RF and PF units whose usual performance under main-force enemy attacks was desultory at best.

In southwest Quang Ngai, on the boundary of Kontum Province, the 70th ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged in heavy fighting with an enemy force east of Gia Vuc in mid-May.

In the hills south of the district town in the Cong Hoa Valley, the 118th RF Battalion was overrun following a heavy artillery concentration.

A three-battalion ARVN relief force failed to make any headway, and PAVN trucks were seen hauling ammunition into Minh Long on 23 August.

General Nhut also wanted to pull the 68th and 69th Rangers out of Sơn Hà and Trà Bồng because these battalions had poor prospects for survival against heavy PAVN firepower.

But without artillery support or airstrikes due to bad weather and losing 50 men killed and as many wounded, the 70th Ranger Battalion was unable to hold.

Some help for beleaguered Quang Ngai Province appeared on 1 October when the 4th Regiment, returned to Chu Lai from its operations in the Quế Sơn Valley to try to recover the terrain lost to the PAVN south of Nghĩa Hành District Town.

[15]: 123–4 In December, the reconstituted battalions of the 14th Ranger Group from Quang Nam Province reinforced the 6th Regiment in heavy fighting on the Batangan Peninsula.

Third, the PAVN had pushed its holdings to the edge of the narrow coastal plain and was within artillery range of nearly every major South Vietnamese installation and population center.

General Nhut organized a relief column to push out from Tam Ky and protect the withdrawal of the territorials and civilians from Tiên Phước.

On 12 March, General Nhut sent the 5th Infantry Regiment from Quang Ngai Province and deployed it west of Tam Ky. Its three battalions were in depth along Route 533, the forward elements just east of My Mountain.

In the northern sectors, on the night of 15/16 March, a PAVN attack destroyed five PF platoons north of Bình Sơn and closed Highway 1 to the Quảng Tín boundary.

The 68th Ranger Battalion, 17 RF platoons, and over 400 PSDF soldiers were flown to Sơn Tịnh District, north of Quang Ngai City.

As the 25 km trek began, the PAVN attacked outposts north of Bình Sơn and severed Highway 1 between that town and Chu Lai.

The feasibility of this task was strained by PAVN sappers who blew an important bridge on Highway 1 between Quang Ngai and Chu Lai.