The German navy under Admiral Holtzendorff desired unrestricted submarine warfare to shut down the North Atlantic trade supplying Britain with food and munitions.
The navy felt that it could starve Britain within six months to a year, before American troops could arrive on the Western Front and change the war.
Pressure mounted on Kaiser Wilhem II to agree with the memo, which he had previously disagreed with due to his commitment to a policy of moderation.
The Kaiser relented following the Allied rejection of the German offer for peace in Dec 1916 and agreed with the memo.
I have the honour to respectfully submit to your Excellency in the attachment a memorandum on the necessity for the commencement an unrestricted campaign of submarine warfare at the earliest opportunity.
Based on the detailed information attached to this memorandum, I would like to ask your Excellency to kindly follow the line of argument laid out below, and I hope to achieve agreement that it is absolutely necessary to increase our measures against England as soon as possible to the very limit of our abilities in order to exploit the favourable situation and to obtain a swift victory.
In all brevity the situation is as follows: The [shipping] rates have reached outrageous levels, often as much as ten times as much [as in peacetime] for many important goods.
The current English merchant tonnage can safely be assumed to be in the order of 20 million gross register tons.
Under such favourable circumstances an energetic blow conducted with all force against English merchant tonnage will promise a certain success in a way that I have to reiterate and emphasize my statements made on 27 August 1916 that "our clearly defined strategic objective is to force a decision in our favour through the destruction of [enemy] sea transport capacity" and also that "from a military point of view it would be irresponsible not to make use of the submarine weapon now."
As things stand at the moment, I cannot vouch that a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare will force England to make peace within five months time.
Of the currently conducted submarine warfare under cruiser a decisive result cannot be expected, regardless of the circumstances, even if all armed merchantmen are designated as legitimate targets.
Based on a monthly rate of destruction of 600,000 tons of shipping through a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, as pointed out previously, and on the well grounded expectation, elaborated upon in the attachment, that at least two fifths of the neutral tonnage sailing in the trade with England will be deterred by such a campaign, it stands to reason that the current volume English sea borne trade will be reduced by 39% within five months.
Finally, it gives us the long hoped for opportunity to strike at neutral munitions shipments, and thus it will also provide a relief for the army.
Experience so far does not suggest that the authorization to torpedo armed merchantmen would improve upon the result of 400,000 tons of destroyed merchant tonnage, which has been achieved over the past two months.
However, I consider it unthinkable that the current English leadership under Lloyd George, who is absolutely determined, could be forced to make peace on these grounds, particularly since the constraints of fat, iron-ore, and wood scarcity—and the latter's impact on the munitions production—would not come into effect.
A further precondition [for success] is that the beginning and the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare should coincide in a manner that leaves no room for negotiations, particularly between England and the neutrals.
It cannot be expected that more than a fraction of the interned central power tonnage in American—and perhaps in other neutral ports—can be put into the trade with England at short notice.
If we do not make use of what seems to be the last chance, then I see no other option than that of mutual exhaustion, without our succeeding to bring the war to an end on terms that will guarantee our future as a world power.