But Lucullus' fortune and consensus among his troops had been wavering for too long, so much so that certain complaints about the recent military campaigns conducted in the East, without prior support from the Senate, also reached Rome, where it was decided to replace the Roman proconsul in command of his province, and to send a large part of his soldiers on leave.

[8] Then Fabius was closed and besieged in Cabira and freed only thanks to the intervention of a second legate, Gaius Valerius Triarius, who happened to be in those parts on his march from Asia towards Lucullus.

[14][15] Having obtained these two victories, Mithridates retreated to the country that the Romans called little Armenia (on the hills near Talauro[16]), destroying everything that he was not able to transport, in order to avoid being reached by Lucullus in his march.

He then proceeded to fortify his kingdom and damaged nearby Cappadocia, while the Romans did nothing, either because they were busy against the pirates of the Mediterranean,[18] or because neither Acilius, nor Lucullus (by now ousted from command), nor Marcius ( new governor of Cilicia), took no action against him.

[19] And while Lucullus was still busy with Mithridates and Tigranes II, Gnaeus Pompey managed to cleanse the entire Mediterranean basin from pirates, wresting from them the island of Crete, the coasts of Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia, demonstrating extraordinary discipline and organizational ability (in 67 BC).

[20] Pompey was then tasked with conducting a new war against Mithridates VI, king of Pontus, in the East (in 66 BC),[21][22] thanks to the lex Manilia, proposed by the plebeian tribune Gaius Manilius, and politically supported by Caesar and Cicero.

But Pompey had adequately organized his supplies (also building a series of water wells[36]), having conquered the Armenian region of Anaitide shortly before.

[37] Pompey was thus able to continue his march passing through the eastern borders of Mithridates' kingdom, establishing a series of new fortified positions (at regular intervals of 25 km from each other).

That same year Pompey effectively defeated Mithridates at the Battle of the Lycus, with the king escaping through Colchis to the Bosporean kingdom north of the Black Sea.

When he did Tigranes submitted and was allowed to keep Armenia, but not those lands he had won by conquest (parts of Cappadocia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia and Sophene).

Pompey left Armenia under the military supervision of Afranius, he sent Gabinius south-east towards Mesopotamia and he himself marched the main army north (into the valley of the river Cyrnus) towards the Kingdom of Albania.

Fearing imminent invasion Artoces (probably the Artag of Georgian history) king of the Iberians turned to diplomacy and promised the Romans unconditional friendship.

Pompey accepted the terms but because he was alerted by his intelligence service that the Iberians were secretly planning an attack, in the spring of 65 BC he marched his forces into Iberia.

Artoces main strength lay in his archers, but, using tactics reminiscent of the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon, Pompey disabled them by means of a rapid infantry charge, which brought his legionaries to close quarters before the enemy fire could take effect.

After subduing Iberia, Pompey headed towards the small kingdom of Colchis and subjugated its main stronghold and various local peoples on the way through both cunning diplomacy and the use of force.

He met up with the admiral Servilius and his fleet in Phasis and commanded them to blockade Mithridates who was still in his Bosporean kingdom, while he returned to Albania to quell a revolt.

[40] Pompey's line of march took him south of Iberia, where he no doubt feared serious hindrance from the inhabitants and a shortage of supplies due to the foraging of the previous campaign, and involved a hazardous crossing of the Cyrnus into Albania.